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INTRODUCTION 
The foundation for the American patent system is purely 
economic.  The entire system stems from a constitutional grant 
of power to Congress to promote the useful arts, not to protect a 
constitutional right.1  Although rights-based theories do influ-
ence debates about intellectual property theory in general, the 
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 1. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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consensus among those studying the American patent system is 
to focus on utilitarian approaches.2 
Similarly, the primary impact of the American patent sys-
tem is economic as well.  Although evidenced by infringement 
 
 2. The rights-based theories are deontological, protection-based theories, 
often called “natural law” theories.  The utilitarian theories are consequential-
ist, promotion-based theories, often called various “incentive” theories.  One 
reason for the persistence of both sets of theories, at least in the American 
context, is the Constitution itself, which grants Congress the power to “pro-
mote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”  Id.  On the one hand, the clause does at least contain the con-
cept of securing or protecting.  Indeed, this clause is the only clause in the en-
tire unamended Constitution that contains the word “right.”  From time to 
time, some have unsuccessfully argued that the mandate is to protect a fun-
damental constitutional right.  On the other hand, in this so-called Patent and 
Copyright Clause, the central and operative verb is “promote,” and for trade-
marks, the constitutional source of Congressional power is the Commerce 
Clause.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  Whereas the rights-based views do 
exert some influence, American intellectual property law is dominantly shaped 
by utilitarian views, with a debate remaining over which utilitarian view 
should prevail.  Although this Article refers only to the debate among utilitar-
ian views, there is equal debate among the various protection-based views.  
Both sides of that debate agree that the patent right is a natural right, but 
they disagree about whether it belongs to the inventor or to society as a whole.  
In keeping with the teachings of Locke, some argue that by mixing one’s labor 
with an invention, one owns the invention as a just reward.  See JOHN LOCKE, 
The Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 303-
20 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690) (setting forth 
Locke’s “just desserts” or “labor” theory).  In keeping with the teachings of 
Hegel, others argue that inventions are so imbued with the labor and person-
hood of the inventor that they fundamentally belong to the individual inventor 
in much the same way that freedom and personal space are considered fun-
damental rights.  See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING 
PROPERTY 44-48 (1993) (discussing Hegel’s “personhood” theory).  Yet those 
natural rights theories tying invention to inventor leave many questions un-
answered.  Assuming inventions are the natural property of the inventor, 
what rights do simultaneous inventors have?  Should independent origination 
be a complete defense to patent infringement as it is for copyright infringe-
ment?  More fundamentally, should the patent right include some affirmative 
right to use?  Alternatively, some natural rights theories tie inventions to soci-
ety.  In keeping with the teachings of Thomas Jefferson, some argue that be-
cause one’s use of knowledge does not interfere with the use by another, 
knowledge must be a fundamental right of society.  See Letter from Thomas 
Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), reprinted in JEFFERSON 
WRITINGS 1291-92 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., Library of America 1984) [herein-
after Letter from Thomas Jefferson] (“He who receives an idea from me, re-
ceives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper 
at mine, receives light without darkening me.”).  See generally DONALD S. 
CHISUM, CRAIG ALLEN NARD, HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ, PAULINE NEWMAN & F. 
SCOTT KIEFF,  PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 1-50 (1998) (reviewing the history 
and philosophy of patent law and collecting sources). 
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verdicts reaching well into the hundreds of millions of dollars,3 
the importance of the patent system cannot be measured 
merely in individual gains and losses.  Economic research has 
shown that the national patent system has an important im-
pact on long term international economic competitiveness and 
that patent law can function as a public policy tool for promot-
ing national economic growth.4 
 
 3. See, e.g., Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 87 F.3d 1559, 1566  (Fed. 
Cir. 1996) (describing the $1.2 billion jury verdict), vacated, 520 U.S. 1111 
(1997); Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. 76-1634-MA, 1991 WL 4087, 
at *5 (D. Mass. Jan. 11, 1991) (awarding approximately $900 million in lost 
profits, royalties, and interest). 
 4. See, e.g., Symposium on Patents and Technology Licensing, 21 RAND 
J. ECON. 103 (1990) (discussing the use of patent law as a tool to promote in-
novation and national economic development).  Economic research over the 
past sixty years has amply established a causal link between the development 
of intellectual property and the growth of our national economy, while also 
showing that intellectual property is an increasingly critical component of 
United States capital and foreign trade.  See generally NATIONAL BUREAU OF 
ECONOMIC RESEARCH, R & D, PATENTS, AND PRODUCTIVITY (Zvi Griliches ed., 
1984) (describing invention and technological change as major forces of growth 
in national economies and studying their connection to patents); Richard C. 
Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Devel-
opment, 1987 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783 (1987) (discussing 
patents as tools for appropriating returns to investments in making and com-
mercializing inventions); Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Em-
pirical Study, 32 MGMT. SCI. 173 (1986) (describing the empirical evidence for 
the link between patents and innovation); Edwin Mansfield, Unauthorized Use 
of Intellectual Property: Effects on Investment, Technology Transfer, and Inno-
vation, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 107 (Mitchell B. Wallerstein et al. eds., 1993) (de-
scribing the impact of intellectual property rights and their enforcement on 
the processes of invention commercialization); Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty 
and the Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 10–12 (1992) (discuss-
ing the impact of patents on firms’ research and development investment deci-
sions).  Much of this work is based on the literature that explores the general 
importance of innovation to the growth of national economies.  See, e.g., SIMON 
S. KUZNETS, SECULAR MOVEMENTS IN PRODUCTION AND PRICES 1-58 (1930) 
(economic research showing a causal link between invention and technical 
change and the growth of national economies); JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, 1 
BUSINESS CYCLES 84-102 (1939) (same) [hereinafter SCHUMPETER, BUSINESS 
CYCLES]; Robert K. Merton, Fluctuations in the Rate of Industrial Invention, 
49 Q.J.  ECON. 454, 464 (1935) (same); GEOFFREY WYATT, THE ECONOMICS OF 
INVENTION 147-231 (1986) (reviewing the field of economic literature on the 
connection between invention and technical change and the growth of national 
economies); Zvi Griliches, Productivity, R&D, and Basic Research at the Firm 
Level in the 1970’s, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 141, 151-53 (1986) (more recent eco-
nomic research showing the same causal link).  All of this research has roots 
in Solow’s Nobel Prize winning work, which demonstrated that most of the 
economic growth in the United States in the first half of this century could be 
explained by investments in research and development and education rather 
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Although the existence of the patent system’s impact is be-
yond dispute, the exact nature of this impact remains a topic of 
significant debate.5  Proponents of the system credit it with bol-
stering the national economy by fostering invention and its 
commercialization.6  Detractors of the system argue that alter-
natives would do an even better job and should therefore be 
used instead.7 
Specific foci of this general debate have recently emerged 
around several controversial trends in the patent system that 
have attracted great attention in the legal, technology, econom-
ics, and business communities.  For example, some question 
changes in the patent system that are perceived to have in-
creased predictability in patent litigation and certainty in pat-
ent law, such as the creation of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit in 1982 and several areas of that 
court’s case law.8  Others question the now routine use of pat-
 
than by increases in capital and labor.  See Robert M. Solow, Technical 
Change and the Aggregate Production Function, 39 REV. ECON. & STAT. 312, 
320 (1957).  Solow’s work is extended in this connection by Romer, who argues 
that such investment in research and development and education is unlike 
other forms of investment in that it does not experience decreasing returns to 
scale.  See Paul M. Romer, Increasing Returns and Long–Run Growth, 94 J. 
POL. ECON. 1002, 1003 (1986).  The more one puts in, the more one gets out, 
and the “bang for the buck” does not decrease as more and more bucks are 
added. 
 5. See, e.g., 8 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS, THE ECONOMICS OF 
PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS 1-129 (John Palmer & Richard O. Zerbe eds., 1986) 
(presenting the views of multiple authors critically reviewing economic theo-
ries about the merits of a patent system); see also CHISUM ET AL., supra note 2, 
at 50-72 (collecting sources and reviewing economic theories about how the 
patent system operates). 
 6. See, e.g., 8 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS, THE ECONOMICS OF 
PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS, supra note 5, at 1-129 (collecting and reviewing 
arguments by proponents of the patent system). 
 7. See, e.g., id. (collecting and reviewing arguments by detractors of the 
patent system). 
 8. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market 
Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Un-
certainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985, 986-89 (1999) 
(criticizing recent increases in certainty in patent law due to the Federal Cir-
cuit’s expanded use of preliminary injunctions and the other courts’ adherence 
to the property right view of patents as an absolute right to exclude); see also 
infra Part II.C.  The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, created in 1982, 
has jurisdiction over appeals in all patent cases throughout the country, re-
gardless of whether they arise from trials in the federal district courts or from 
proceedings before the Patent and Trademark Office.  See Federal Courts Im-
provement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 127, 96 Stat. 25, 37 (1982) (creat-
ing a unified forum for patent appeals in the Federal Circuit by merging the 
Court of Claims with the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and transfer-
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ents to protect subject matter that many previously considered 
to be ineligible for patent protection, such as living organisms, 
gene fragments, computer software, and financial services.9 
 
ring to the new court jurisdiction over appeals from patent cases that were 
tried in the district courts).  The creation of such a unified forum for patent 
appeals was not without debate.  See, e.g., Gerald J. Mossinghoff, The Creation 
of the Federal Circuit, in CHISUM ET AL., supra note 2, at 29 (providing discus-
sion by a former Patent and Trademark Office Commissioner about the impact 
of the Federal Circuit on efforts to bring certainty and stability to U.S. patent 
law); cf. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Spe-
cialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1989) (discussing contested issues 
surrounding the creation of the Federal Circuit).  Indeed, the Federal Circuit 
has increased certainty in the patent system in general through landmark de-
cisions in several discrete areas of the court’s case law and has consistently 
reaffirmed the nature of the patent right as a property right, with an absolute 
right of exclusion that is clearly defined and marked by clear and fixed 
boundaries.  See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 
979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (holding the construc-
tion of patent claims to be a question of law, not fact, and subject to de novo 
review by only one intermediate court of appeals, the Federal Circuit); Vitron-
ics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582-85 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (review-
ing strict recipe for the use of various forms of evidence in construing patent 
claims); Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 833 F.2d 930, 931 (Fed. Cir. 
1986) (refusing to stay an injunction pending appeal after recognizing that the 
public policy interest in protecting rights secured by the patent outweighs the 
public demand for increased quantity of a good presently covered by a patent); 
Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1212-13 (Fed. Cir. 1991) 
(applying the statutory requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 that the text of the 
patent application as filed contain sufficient disclosure to enable one in the art 
to make and use whatever is covered by patent claims as eventually issued); 
Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding 
that 35 U.S.C. § 112 requires the text of the patent application as filed to sat-
isfy the separate and distinct written description requirement so as to rea-
sonably convey to those in the art exactly what is covered by the patent claims 
as eventually issued); Amgen v. Chugai, 927 F.2d 1200 (applying a separate 
written description requirement to claims in the field of biotechnology); Fiers 
v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1169-71 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (solidifying the court’s posi-
tion on a separate written description requirement); Regents of the Univ. of 
Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (solidifying further 
the court’s position on a separate written description requirement); Lockwood 
v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1571-72 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (applying the 
same written description requirement to the field of computer software); Gen-
try Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1478-80 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(holding that the written description requirement is not limited to complex 
technologies and applies equally to simple technologies, like sofa recliners); see 
also infra text accompanying notes 115, 170. 
 9. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter 
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 698-701 
(1998) (criticizing the availability and use of patents on gene fragments and 
other biological materials); James Gleick, Patently Absurd, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
12, 2000, § 6 (Magazine), at 44 (criticizing the expanding use of patents in e-
commerce); Seth Shulman, Software Patents Tangle the Web, TECH. REV. 
Mar./Apr. 2000, at 68 (discussing the technology community’s views on the 
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In reaction to these recent trends in the patent system, 
several critics have suggested that the system’s goals can be 
better achieved by implementing a variety of approaches that 
avoid or mitigate the potentially output-restricting monopoly-
type impact of property rights.  Suggested approaches include 
cash rewards,10 buy-outs,11 and the use of liability rules,12 as 
distinct from property rules.  This article uses the important 
 
pros and cons of software patents); William Falloon, Patent Power: Who Owns 
the Ideas that Drive Derivatives, RISK, Dec. 1999, at 22 (discussing the story 
behind Columbia University’s patent for the quasi-Monte Carlo method of 
valuing derivatives and the financial community’s views on the larger debate 
over financial patents); see also infra text accompanying notes 112-15, 203-12.  
See generally CHISUM ET AL., supra note 2, at 729-893 (reviewing shifts in pat-
ent law’s requirements of utility and statutory subject matter and collecting 
diverse commentaries from legal, technology, and business communities de-
fending and criticizing these shifts).  Today, as a matter of positive law, there 
is no per se exception to patents on living things, computer software, or busi-
ness methods.  See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980) (holding 
that living organisms are patentable subject matter); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 
U.S. 175, 176 (1981) (“A claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory 
does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula, 
computer program, or digital computer.”); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (holding that a computer system for producing a 
smooth waveform on a raster display is patentable subject matter); State St. 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373-74 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999) (holding that a hub and spoke 
mutual fund accounting system is patentable subject matter). 
 10. See generally, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL & TANGUY VAN YPERSELE, 
REWARDS VERSUS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, NATIONAL BUREAU OF 
ECON. RESEARCH WORKING PAPER NO. 6956 (1999) (suggesting a system of 
government-sponsored cash rewards instead of or in addition to a system of 
patents and highlighting advantages of such a system to fields where the dis-
parity between average cost and marginal cost is typically large, citing in par-
ticular fields previously considered by some to be largely ineligible for patent 
protection, like modern biotechnology products and computer software).  For 
further discussion of the cash rewards system, see infra Part I. 
 11. See generally, e.g., MICHAEL KREMER, PATENT BUY-OUTS: A 
MECHANISM FOR ENCOURAGING INNOVATION, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECON. 
RESEARCH WORKING PAPER NO. 6304 (1997) (suggesting a system in which the 
government buys out patents after conducting an auction to determine an ap-
propriate buy-out price and highlighting advantages of such a system to fields 
where the disparity between average cost and marginal cost is typically large, 
citing in particular fields previously considered by some to be largely ineligible 
for patent protection, like modern biotechnology products and the design of 
computer chips).  For further discussion of the cash rewards system, see infra 
Part I. 
 12. See, e.g., Ayres & Klemperer, supra note 8, at 1020-23 (suggesting 
that patents be enforced through liability rules, under which infringement is 
permitted but generates a damage award to rights-holders, instead of property 
rules, under which rights-holders enjoy an absolute right to enforce their 
rights through injunctions); see also infra Part II.C. 
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contributions made by these commentators to reveal shortcom-
ings in any view of the patent system that focuses only on in-
centives to engage in inventive activity.13 
This Article offers a new view of the patent system that 
embraces property rights and property rules as essential ele-
ments for achieving core goals of the patent system, and forges 
a surprising link among disparate features of the system previ-
ously considered to be unrelated or even mutually antitheti-
cal.14  According to this view, the treatment of patents as prop-
erty rights is necessary to facilitate investment in the complex, 
costly, and risky commercialization activities required to turn 
nascent inventions into new goods and services.15  Further-
more, property treatment is equally necessary to help society 
decide which inventive activities are worth protecting in the 
first instance.16 
Such a commercialization view not only reveals how the re-
cently suggested alternatives17 fail to address these important 
goals of the patent system and would actually frustrate them18 
but it also shows how the current system already addresses the 
concerns raised by such commentary.19  This Article argues 
that the power to restrict use that is conferred by a patentee’s 
property right20 and the strict enforcement of this right with a 
property rule, rather than a liability rule,21 are paradoxically 
essential to avoiding underuse.  This Article also argues that 
the ability to use price discrimination to avoid the dead-weight 
loss potentially caused by a property owner’s power over price22 
 
 13. See discussion infra Part I. 
 14. See discussion infra Parts I-II. 
 15. See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 16. See discussion infra Part I.B. 
 17. See supra text accompanying notes 10-12. 
 18. See discussion infra Part I. 
 19. See discussion infra Part II. 
 20. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 21. See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 22. See discussion infra Part II.B.  Dead-weight loss refers to the loss in 
potential social wealth when a competitive market is compared to an other-
wise identical market in which there is monopoly power, or power over price.  
In a competitive market for a product, society is made better off by sales of 
such a product through the creation of both a producer surplus and a con-
sumer surplus.  These forms of surplus can be understood through an example 
in which there is an efficient market for ice cream cones and a wealthy adult 
and an average child each consuming the same size cone in that market.  The 
market sets the price for the cone.  Although the child may value the cone at 
about its price, the wealthy adult may value the cone much more than the 
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and the ability to use patents as tools for avoiding or challeng-
ing monopolies23 are essential to explaining the perceived 
paradox of strong patent laws persisting in the face of antitrust 
laws. 
This Article further shows how the commercialization 
view’s link among patents, property rights, and price discrimi-
nation also operated to inform and motivate the framers of our 
current patent system.24  This Article then shows how such a 
commercialization view may help explain many controversial 
trends in the existing patent system, including those that 
sparked the recent critical commentary.25  This view also helps 
explain similar controversial trends in other intellectual prop-
erty regimes such as trademarks.26 
 
 
price.  Each consumer receives a benefit for exchanging money for cone, which 
is why the exchange is made voluntarily, but some consumers may value the 
exchanged good substantially above the exchange price.  Consumer surplus 
represents the aggregate amount that all consumers in the market are made 
better off by the exchanges made at market price.  More specifically, consumer 
surplus is the difference between what consumers are willing to pay and what 
they actually pay.  In contradistinction, producer surplus is the difference be-
tween what a producer collects as payment for the good, the market price, and 
the marginal cost of producing that good.  In this simple market, social sur-
plus is the amount that producers and consumers in aggregate are made bet-
ter off for having made the market exchange.  In more dynamic and complex 
models, social surplus also includes any positive benefit that may flow to those 
who are external to the two-person exchange, so-called positive externalities.  
Kremer and Shavell and van Ypersele point out that the patent owner may 
not be able to capture the full social surplus of the invention because some will 
be enjoyed by others as consumer surplus or positive externalities.  See 
KREMER, supra note 11, at 1; SHAVELL & VAN YPERSELE, supra note 10, at 5-6.  
They also argue that some of the social surplus will be lost due to the monop-
oly power wielded by a patentee.  See KREMER, supra note 11, at 1; SHAVELL & 
VAN YPERSELE, supra note 10, at 5-6.  In a typical monopoly market, the mo-
nopolist restricts output so that a higher price can be charged.  This shift in 
price and output causes some consumer surplus in the competitive market to 
become producer surplus, thereby making the monopolist better off than under 
the competitive market.  The shift also causes some consumer surplus and 
some producer surplus to be lost.  This combined loss is the so-called dead-
weight loss of a monopoly market and represents a net decrease in social sur-
plus due to the shift from competitive to monopoly markets.  For a more de-
tailed discussion of the comparison between monopoly and competitive mar-
kets in the context of inventions, see CHISUM ET AL., supra note 2, at 50-58. 
 23. See infra text accompanying notes 199-202. 
 24. See discussion infra Part III. 
 25. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 26. See discussion infra Part V. 
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I.  PROBLEMS WITH REWARD ALTERNATIVES TO 
PATENTS 
Some critics of the patent system have argued that permit-
ting inventors to leverage the patent right to exclude in ex-
change for royalties (or injunctions and damages) is a sloppy 
reward for inventive effort.27  The inventor may be unable to 
recoup the full social surplus created by the invention.28  For 
example, the lure of market power may cause investment in in-
ventive activity to exceed social surplus.29  And the patent’s 
power to restrict output and raise price may create dead-weight 
loss.30  Instead, Shavell and van Ypersele,31 and Kremer,32 
among others, offer different systems designed to improve the 
match between social surplus and the amount an inventor will 
recoup while simultaneously avoiding the patent’s potential 
power over price and its commensurate dead-weight loss.  
These critics offer two alternatives to the current patent sys-
tem.  The general features of the offered alternatives are first 
outlined individually below.  The details of their implications 
are subsequently discussed together. 
Shavell and van Ypersele suggest a system of cash rewards 
paid by the government to inventors.33  Under this system, in-
 
 27. See, e.g., KREMER, supra note 11, at 1-5; SHAVELL & VAN YPERSELE, 
supra note 10, at 1-8.  Technological progress is a complex and multi-step 
process.  To be sure, the act of inventing is essential, but it is only one of the 
early steps in the process.  At a minimum, members of society other than the 
original inventor must receive some benefit from nascent inventions before so-
ciety at large can be considered to have enjoyed technological progress.  Such 
benefit may be in the form of information about the invention, a product of the 
invention, or a useful embodiment of the invention.  The collective act of 
transmitting benefit from nascent inventions to those other than the inventor 
is here referred to as commercialization.  This Article offers a view of the pat-
ent system that is tied to commercialization, rather than to inventing.  For 
more on the commercialization process itself, see discussion infra Part I.A. 
 28. See KREMER, supra note 11, at 1-5; SHAVELL & VAN YPERSELE, supra 
note 10, at 1-8.  Social surplus is the amount of total social welfare generated 
by the invention less the costs of making the invention, such as research by 
the inventor and the inventor’s competitors.  Social welfare is the aggregate 
value of all utility that individuals obtain from the invention. 
 29. See KREMER, supra note 11, at 1-5; SHAVELL & VAN YPERSELE, supra 
note 10, at 1-8. 
 30. See KREMER, supra note 11, at 1-5; SHAVELL & VAN YPERSELE, supra 
note 10, at 1-8. 
 31. See SHAVELL & VAN YPERSELE, supra note 10, at 1-8 (suggesting the 
government give cash rewards instead of or in addition to patents). 
 32. See KREMER, supra note 11, at 1-5 (suggesting the government step in 
to buy out patents after they have been issued). 
 33. See SHAVELL & VAN YPERSELE, supra note 10, at 1. 
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ventions pass immediately into the public domain, becoming 
freely available to all.34  The government would then set the 
amount of reward based on information about demand in the 
form of actual sales data gathered after the invention is 
made.35  Importantly, Shavell and van Ypersele demonstrate 
that the government’s use of actual sales data gathered after 
an invention is made will most likely yield better information 
about demand than any special knowledge possessed by the in-
ventor before deciding whether to engage in the inventive activ-
ity.36  Shavell and van Ypersele conclude that a patent system 
does not enjoy any fundamental advantage over a reward sys-
tem.37  They further conclude that a mixed system under which 
the innovator is allowed to seek either a patent or a reward is 
superior to a system offering only patents.38 
Kremer similarly suggests a system in which the govern-
ment pays patentees to return their patents to the public do-
main.39  He calls this a system of patent buy-outs.40  As in the 
Shavell and van Ypersele system, patents that have been 
bought out under Kremer’s system will pass immediately into 
the public domain with their claimed inventions becoming 
freely available to all.41  Under Kremer’s system, the govern-
ment would use an auction to estimate the private value of pat-
ents.42  The government would buy out most patents put to auc-
tion, but in order to induce bidders to reveal their true 
evaluations, a few patents would be sold to bidders.43  Because 
bidders would not know which patents would be purchased, 
they would have incentives to value them all honestly.44  
Kremer concludes that it is impossible to know based on theory 
alone whether patent buy-outs would provide a useful supple-
 
 34. See id.  Shavell and van Ypersele propose that instead of granting a 
patent, the government should pay a cash reward funded by general tax reve-
nues.  Id.  Because the heart of the patent right is the right to exclude, see 35 
U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1994), absent patents, everyone would be free to make and 
use the invention, unless of course there existed prohibitions from other areas 
of law, such as food and drug or environmental law. 
 35. See SHAVELL & VAN YPERSELE, supra note 10, at 21-22. 
 36. See id. at 22. 
 37. Id. at 1. 
 38. Id. 
 39. KREMER, supra note 11, at 1. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 2. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
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ment to the existing patent system.45  However, he recommends 
a limited trial to better evaluate the proposal.46 
Before unpacking the detailed implications of these two 
proposed alternatives to the patent system, it must be recog-
nized that they are offered through substantial papers present-
ing mathematical economic models that do elucidate several 
larger issues.  Most importantly, the models demonstrate that 
rewardswhether cash, praise, or otherwise, and whether 
given by the government or a private actorcan operate like 
patents as tools for promoting inventive activity.  This Article 
does not address the relative strengths of the many available 
tools for promoting inventive activity.  Rather, the section that 
follows addresses the relative strengths of rewards and patents 
in promoting the larger process of technological progress 
through invention commercialization. 
A. COMMERCIALIZATION 
Any system focused on rewarding inventive effort, when an 
actual good or service is brought to the market, runs the risk of 
failing to address the activities that take place after an inven-
tion is made but before it can be profitably exploited.47  The in-
 
 45. Id. at 46.  As an alternative to the proposed cash reward and buy-out 
systems, the government could act through the tax system by providing a tax 
credit, for example.  See, e.g., OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. 
CONGRESS, INNOVATION AND COMMERCIALIZATION OF EMERGING 
TECHNOLOGY 90-94 (1995) [hereinafter INNOVATION AND COMMERCIALIZATION 
OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGY] (discussing the influence of tax and credit provi-
sions on invention commercialization). 
 46. INNOVATION AND COMMERCIALIZATION OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGY, 
supra note 45, at 90-94. 
 47. See id. at 3, 20-96 (collecting sources and setting forth as principle 
findings and describing in detail how successful commercialization is not sim-
ply a matter of developing technology first or getting to market first, but in-
stead requires intellectual property protection to create an environment con-
ducive to securing complimentary assets, skills, capital, manufacturing, 
marketing, and support); cf. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 2, at 62-72 (collecting 
sources and reviewing diverse incentive theories of the patent system includ-
ing “incentive to invent,” “incentive to disclose,” “incentive to commercialize,” 
and “incentive to design around”).  The incentive to commercialize theory dis-
cussed herein is similar in some respects to the “prospect” theory elucidated by 
Kitch, which views the patent as important in providing incentives for invest-
ment in increasing the value of a patented technology.  See Edmund W. Kitch, 
The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 276-77 
(1977).  The view offered in this Article is not critical of the approach offered 
by Kitch.  Instead, this Article offers an alternative to Kitch’s analysis that 
links together three different sets of literature not addressed in his work and 
not previously interconnected: the patent law and economics literature leading 
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vention must be developed into some commercial embodi-
ment.48  Capital may have to be raised.49  Production facilities 
and labor must be made available.50  Distribution channels 
must be created.51  Consumers must be educated about the ex-
istence and benefits of this new good or service.52  Each of these 
activities requires investment from the holder of the invention, 
and many others, such as product development teams, invest-
ment bankers, venture capitalists, labor sources, and advertis-
ers.53  As each of these people moves into action to make such 
investments (so-called first movers), there may be numerous 
other market participants (so-called second movers) who subse-
quently move to compete at each step of the larger endeavor.  
Some of the costs borne by a first mover also would be borne by 
any second mover.  Some costs, however, will be borne only by 
the first mover, because once incurred they will yield benefits 
for the entire class of competitors, embracing first movers and 
second movers.54 
Second movers generally enjoy numerous advantages over 
the first movers against whom they compete.55  Consider, for 
 
up to the framing of the present patent system that is codified in the 1952 
Patent Act, see discussion infra Part III; the law and economics literature on 
property rights and property rules, like that of Demsetz, see discussion infra 
Part II; and the component of the contemporary law and economics literature 
that is critical of recent trends in the patent system, like that discussed infra 
in Parts I-II.  This Article also resurfaces the important screening, see infra 
text accompanying notes 71-78, and potential monopoly-challenging, see infra 
text accompanying notes 199-202, functions of the present patent.  The com-
mercialization label is used here in deference to its use by the framers of the 
current patent system around the time the system was drafted.  See discussion 
infra Part III.  See also infra text accompanying note 189 (using “commercial-
ize” label).   
 48. INNOVATION AND COMMERCIALIZATION OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGY, 
supra note 45, at 3, 20-96. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id.; see also JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 61-94 (1983) (discussing the important role of market power 
like that afforded by a patent’s right to exclude in organizing invention 
commercialization activity) [hereinafter SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT]; JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, 
AND DEMOCRACY 81-110 (3d ed. 1950) (same) [hereinafter SCHUMPETER, 
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY]; SCHUMPETER, BUSINESS CYCLES, 
supra note 4, at 84-192 (same). 
 54. See id. 
 55. See id.  See generally Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardiza-
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example, that a second mover’s mere knowledge of a first 
mover’s success eliminates a great deal of risk from the second 
mover’s decision whether to embark on the same enterprise.56  
The mere knowledge that a problem has been solved may pro-
vide psychological motivation to attempt a solution.57  In addi-
tion, successfully developed products and distribution channels 
are by their nature difficult to keep secret and can serve as 
working models for competitors to follow, thereby saving them 
the cost of weeding out worse alternatives.58  Furthermore, the 
costs of capital will decline throughout the industry because in-
vestors will become educated about its specific risks and poten-
tial for profit.59  Similarly, the education of consumers and 
arousal of consumer demand will benefit all competitors 
equally.60  Indeed, the arrival of a competitor into the market 
will force the first mover to incur added costs of brand advertis-
ing, on top of the costs of more general product advertising al-
ready incurred.61 
 
tion, Compatibility and Innovation, 16 RAND. J. ECON. 70, 75-79 (1985) (de-
scribing second-mover advantages); Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Competi-
tion, Compatibility and Standards: The Economics of Horses, Penguins and 
Lemmings, in PRODUCT STANDARDIZATION AND COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 1 (H. 
Landis Gabel ed., 1987) (providing illustrative examples of second-mover ad-
vantages). 
 56. See generally ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, 
MICROECONOMICS 149 (1989) (discussing the value of information in reducing 
uncertainty generally). 
 57. This may be due in part to risk aversion.  See id. at 139 (discussing 
attitudes toward risk).  At the least, it is often easier to solve a problem once it 
is known to be solvable. 
 58. Trade secrecy is not a viable means for protecting anything that can 
be easily reverse engineered.  Cf. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christo-
pher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1015 (5th Cir. 1971) (drawing a distinction between in-
formation voluntarily disclosed for which there is no trade secret protection 
and the use of industrial espionage to improperly peer into a competitor’s 
trade secret safe). 
 59. See INNOVATION AND COMMERCIALIZATION OF EMERGING 
TECHNOLOGY, supra note 45, at 3, 20-96. 
 60. This type of second-mover advantage can be mitigated by the first 
mover’s proper trademark use, in which the mark is always accompanied by a 
generic description.  See SIEGRUN D. KANE, TRADEMARK LAW: A 
PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE § 4:2.1[A] (1999) (discussing the importance of proper 
trademark use in avoiding possible loss of rights in the mark by letting it be-
come a generic term). 
 61. Investments in brand name recognition and consumer goodwill are 
typically stored in a company’s trademarks, which indicate to consumers that 
the marked products come only from one particular source.  See id. § 1:1.1 (de-
scribing trademarks as identifiers of source and vessels of goodwill). 
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The patent right to exclude competitors who have not 
shared in bearing these initial costs provides incentives for the 
holder of the invention and the other players in this market to 
come together and incur all costs necessary to facilitate com-
mercialization of the patented invention.62  Therefore, although 
a simple reward for inventive effort might provide adequate in-
centives for invention itself, the nascent invention may never 
reach a single consumer without the above incentives to com-
mercialize.63 
The Shavell and van Ypersele system seems to contemplate 
that at least some amount of commercialization will be allowed 
to take place because the amount of reward is to be based on 
data from actual sales.64  But their suggested system does not 
make clear how far along the commercialization chain the in-
vention must have progressed before a reward will accrue.  The 
reward will fail to provide incentives for complete commerciali-
zation if a right to it is given too soon after the completion of 
invention and commencement of commercialization.65 
If the moment of entitlement to the reward is pushed later 
along the commercialization timeline, then the reward will 
generate some bad, rent-dissipating effects.  Rent dissipation 
occurs when the lure of a reward causes too many individuals 
 
 62. The patentee, and indeed anyone who has incurred such initial costs, 
will want to charge a price for the invention or its embodiments that includes 
both the marginal cost of producing each additional unit of output as well as 
these fixed costs of initial development.  A second mover who has not incurred 
such initial costs will be able to charge a lower price that is based only on the 
marginal cost of producing each additional unit of output.  Without the right 
to exclude, the patentee would also have to charge this lower price as well or 
lose all sales to the competitor.  Because the patent right to exclude allows the 
patentee to charge the higher price, the availability of this right provides in-
centives for the holder of the invention to incur these costs.  The ability to ob-
tain an assignment or license from the patentee similarly provides incentives 
for the other players in the market to incur such costs, in a cooperative fash-
ion.  Optimally, each step in the commercialization process is carried out by 
the lowest cost provider of that service. 
 63. The suggested reward alternatives do not explain how a reward sys-
tem would operate in practice.  More particularly, it is not clear how soon after 
the invention is made the reward would be given or the right to a reward 
would attach.  If the right to a reward attaches immediately after the inven-
tion is made, then the reward will only provide incentives for inventive activ-
ity and not incentives for commercialization. 
 64. See supra text accompanying notes 33-38. 
 65. It is not clear that any individual will have adequate incentives to in-
vest in commercializing an invention for which a reward, and not a patent, has 
been issued if the right to the reward attaches to the one who completes the 
invention. 
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to engage in the rewarded activity.66  Some rent dissipation 
may be due to an increase in the size of the reward.67  In the 
case of rewards for inventions, as the entitlement to the reward 
is pushed later along the commercialization timeline, the size of 
the reward will have to increase to cover the costs of some 
commercialization activity in addition to inventive activity. 
The shift down the commercialization timeline of the enti-
tlement to the reward will also increase the uncertainty over 
who will be a reward recipient.  As this uncertainty increases, 
the invention-inducing power of the reward may decrease, or 
the undesirable rent-dissipating power may increase.  The de-
sirable, invention-inducing power of the reward may decrease 
because each individual would-be inventor may find the possi-
bility of reward to be too low to induce investment in the in-
venting enterprise.  Alternatively, the undesirable, rent-
dissipating power may increase as the increase in uncertainty 
causes even more individuals to gamble on inventive activity in 
the hopes of winning the reward.68 
Shavell and van Ypersele argue that the patent system and 
the reward system both face equal problems with such rent dis-
sipation.69  While both systems may induce a race at the inven-
tion stage, however, the race under a reward system in which 
the entitlement to reward attaches late in the commercializa-
tion process will continue through the commercialization stage.  
 
 66. For example, the possibility of winning a reward for inventing may 
induce more than the optimal number of people to incur the costs of attempt-
ing to invent.  As a result, although each individual may rationally decide to 
make such an attempt because the reward is greater than that individual’s 
private costs, so many individuals may make attempts that the aggregate 
costs of inventing may exceed the invention’s social surplus.  See generally 
Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. 
L. REV. 305 (1992) (discussing rent-seeking, and therefore rent-dissipating, 
behavior surrounding inventions).  Under the present patent system, in cases 
where an invention has been independently invented by more than one person, 
only one inventor, if any, may receive a patent for that invention.  See 35 
U.S.C. § 102(g) (1994) (setting forth the statutory basis for contests over prior-
ity of invention called “interferences”). 
 67. See Grady & Alexander, supra note 66, at 321 (discussing the connec-
tion between the size of reward and the extent of rent dissipation). 
 68. This seemingly irrational behavior may occur for the same reason that 
individuals decide to buy lottery tickets.  The decision to buy lottery tickets is 
irrational if the calculation only includes cost of ticket and benefit associated 
with the likelihood of cash reward.  The decision may be rational if it takes 
into account the psychological benefit some people enjoy from simply buying a 
ticket even in the face of poor odds. 
 69. SHAVELL & VAN YPERSELE, supra note 10, at 23. 
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The rent-dissipating impact that results will also be worse.  
Thus, as compared with a reward system, the patent system 
may be not only better able to improve coordination among 
market players engaged in the invention commercialization 
process, it also may be better able to avoid rent dissipation.70 
The reward alternatives, however, face additional problems 
beyond coordination and rent dissipation.  The problem of iden-
tifying reward recipients is itself a significant problem.  As dis-
cussed in the next section, the problem of selecting reward re-
cipients reveals both a significant practical hurdle to the 
implementation of reward systems and a particularly elegant 
feature of the patent system. 
B. SCREENING 
A central flaw in reward systems is their failure to address 
the important role played in the current system by competitors 
of the patentee.  The threat of an injunction by a federal court 
draws a competitor’s careful attention to issues of validity.  
Both liability and injunction can be completely avoided by a 
showing that the claimed invention was not in the first in-
stance “worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive 
patent.”71  Validity issues may be raised as a complete defense 
to an infringement suit or may support their own declaratory 
judgment action.72  In either case, the patentee’s competitors 
serve an important policing function in the patent system by 
searching out and bringing to bear the best information they 
can find about a patent’s validity.73  Validity-destroying infor-
mation—such as prior art—may be in the possession of the 
 
 70. See generally Grady & Alexander, supra note 66 (discussing a patent’s 
role in limiting post-invention rent-seeking, and therefore rent-dissipating, 
behavior). 
 71. Letter from Thomas Jefferson, supra note 2, at 1292. 
 72. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1994). 
 73. Competitors of the patentee often are well informed about the field of 
endeavor and have different information than the patentee.  Patent examina-
tion is an ex parte proceeding and only the prior art known by the applicant 
and the examiner are considered when assessing patentability.  Although is-
sued patents are presumed valid, information not considered by the Patent 
Office is often instrumental in a court order of invalidity.  The federal courts, 
not the Patent Office, are the final arbiter of validity.  E.g., Quad Envtl. Techs. 
Corp. v. Union Sanitary Dist., 946 F.2d 870, 875-76 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“The 
courts are the final arbiter of patent validity and, although courts may take 
cognizance of, and benefit from, the proceedings before the patent examiner, 
the question is ultimately for the courts to decide, without deference to the rul-
ings of the patent examiner.”). 
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competitor, or it may be found only after scouring public and 
private sources around the world. 
Shavell and van Ypersele maintain that the government 
may have better information concerning the ultimate market 
demand for a product after sales have occurred than a patentee 
would have before deciding to invent.74  The existence of mar-
ket demand, however, does not establish that the invention it-
self would have been patentable, and no market participant 
would have an adequate incentive to provide the government 
with information relating to patentability.75  In addition, the 
government’s ability to uncover such information itself may be 
substantially less than that of a competitor under the current 
system, especially where the competitor possesses the informa-
tion.76 
It is possible that Shavell and van Ypersele are not con-
cerned with validity issues.  For example, their system of re-
wards may be indifferent between new technologies and re-
vived ones.  Rewards, however, would be very difficult to dole 
out in such a system.  Every market having large demand 
would generate droves of reward claimants each asserting to 
have made some contribution.  Thus, reward systems face the 
serious practical hurdle of having to develop an effective 
 
 74. SHAVELL & VAN YPERSELE, supra note 10, at 22. 
 75. Individual taxpayers would face an enormous collective action prob-
lem, each one facing only a minute pro-rata benefit while bearing the entire 
search cost.  Although those who would be rival claimants to inventor status 
in a patent system would present themselves as rival claimants to the cash 
reward, contests among rival claimants to a patent (called interference pro-
ceedings) are relatively rare compared with challenges to validity based on 
lack of novelty, obviousness, or inadequate disclosure.  See, e.g., 1987 Commit-
tee Report, 1987 A.B.A. SEC. PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. 64 (noting that 
the interference practice in the United States in 1987 typically involved less 
than 0.25% of all patent applications, or about three hundred of the approxi-
mately 130,000 applications filed each year). 
 76. Additional evidence supporting this point can be found in the example 
of the present Patent and Trademark Office, which issues numerous patents 
that are later found invalid by a federal court based on prior art not uncovered 
during examination.  See supra note 73 and accompanying text.  This occurs 
even though the Patent Office is funded through user fees and is not resource 
constrained, generating a budget surplus of over $70 million per year.  See 
PTO Fees Will Remain With Agency, Under FY 2000 Budget Plan, Dickinson 
Says, 57 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 282, 282 (1999) (discussing Patent 
Office funding and the budget surplus).  Implicit in the commercialization 
view of the patent system offered in this Article is the understanding that the 
Patent Office is not malfunctioning when it issues such patents.  Indeed, ac-
cording to this view, the system is not operating grossly out of tune with its 
design. 
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method for deciding how to allocate the rewards among all such 
possible claimants.77 
In contradistinction, the patent system does not face such a 
hurdle.  The same core legal rules that drive the patent system 
simultaneously provide the system with its own method for de-
ciding which inventive activities are eligible to receive the 
benefit of a patent.  The tests of novelty, nonobviousness, and 
adequacy of disclosure serve this decisional function for the 
patent system, and they discipline the system through litiga-
tion and its threat.78 
A system of patent buy-outs offered by Kremer may pro-
vide a solution to the validity problem faced by the cash reward 
model.79  Under Kremer’s proposal, the government would use 
an auction to estimate the private value of patents.80  The gov-
ernment would buy out most patents put to auction, but in or-
der to induce bidders to reveal their true evaluations, a few 
patents would be sold to bidders.81  Because bidders would not 
 
 77. The problems with allocating rewards or any other kind of kudos for 
good results are legion.  Consider the general problem of allocating fame: 
What exactly constitutes an honest fame, what a dishonest fame?  
What are the rules, criteria, precepts, principles, if there be any, by 
which we decide whom to accord how much glory for what achieve-
ment, and by which we decide who has laid claim to fame that isn’t 
his?  Are there such rules, and do they span the full range of moral, 
scientific, and artistic accomplishments for which glory is bestowed? 
LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS: EVASION, BLACKMAIL, FRAUD, AND KINDRED 
PUZZLES OF THE LAW 200 (1996).  Katz uses societal rules for blame embodied 
in the criminal law to attempt to derive societal rules for fame.  See id. at 201 
(describing the symmetrical relationship between societal rules of praise and 
blame).  Concerning the distinction between acts and omissions, one might ask 
what level of contribution is required on the part of a supervising faculty 
member for co-authorship or co-inventorship.  Is active advice required, or is 
passive permission and non-interference sufficient where others would have 
refused to allow or continue a project?  Cf. id. at 201-03 (discussing the signifi-
cance of affirmative acts, omissions, and motive in establishing the principles 
of praise).  Also consider how the rules of praise should evaluate the problems 
presented by cases of mere thought, transferred intent, or unreasonable hopes, 
any of which might nonetheless correlate with inventive success.  Cf. id.  To 
what extent should originality, effort, genius, or utility drive our decisions to 
allocate rewards?  Cf. id. at 203-04 (describing the tension between originality 
and utilitarianum as the basis of rewards for scientific progress). 
 78. Cf. infra text accompanying note 195 (arguing that the desire to ob-
tain a broad-reaching patent is moderated by the vulnerability of such a pat-
ent on various validity grounds in litigation). 
 79. See KREMER, supra note 11, at 1. 
 80. Id. at 2. 
 81. Id.  (explaining that the government would randomly select a few pat-
ents to be sold to the highest bidder). 
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know which patents would be purchased, they would have in-
centives to value them all honestly.82  Like cash rewards, pat-
ent buy-outs would operate to eliminate the patentee’s poten-
tial power over price and its commensurate dead-weight loss.83 
The informational advantage of Kremer’s proposal over a 
system of cash rewards comes from the fact that the bidders in 
Kremer’s system are potential patent owners.  Before bidding, 
such potential owners will be sure not only to acquire informa-
tion about the market demand for the invention claimed in the 
patents but also about patent validity.  Indeed, the incentives 
for such bidders to acquire information about validity will be 
similar to the incentives facing potential infringers under a 
patent system.84  Thus, the valuation set by Kremer’s system 
will be better or more cheaply informed about issues of validity 
than the cash reward system offered by Shavell and van 
Ypersele. 
Nevertheless, both proposed systems—rewards and buy-
outs—present the same timing paradox discussed earlier.85  To 
the extent the reward or buy-out is implemented soon after the 
invention is made, the systems fail to provide incentives for full 
commercialization, thereby preventing nascent inventions from 
reaching consumers.86  To the extent the reward or buy-out is 
implemented long after the invention is made, and presumably 
before the expiration of patent term,87 then incentives for some 
level of commercialization are present but both systems merely 
amount to a decrease in patent term with respect to their im-
pact on subsequent commercialization. 
It is possible that a decrease in patent term may not upset 
the patent system.  To be sure, any particular systemic patent 
 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 1-2. 
 84. Such bidders will want to acquire information about the patent’s va-
lidity because the bidder may become the owner of the patent and have to rely 
on asserting the patent to recoup the price paid at the consummated sale of 
the patent.  A purchased patent that was ultimately adjudicated invalid by a 
court would be a loss to the bidder who purchased that patent.  See supra text 
accompanying note 73. 
 85. See supra text accompanying notes 64-65. 
 86. See id. 
 87. The possibility of implementing the reward or buy-out so long after 
the invention is made that it is also after the expiration of patent term sug-
gests use of the reward or buy-out as a mere adjunct to, not replacement for, 
the current patent system.  Although this use must be considered in any bal-
anced policy of industrial development, it is not the focus of the reward and 
buy-out systems offered by critics of the patent system. 
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term represents an arbitrary compromise.  Any term will sat-
isfy a commercialization theory of the patent system if it re-
mains sufficiently long and is fixed, publicly noticed, and oth-
erwise inexpensive to administer.  Kremer points out one way 
to compensate for a shortened term, which would be to add a 
multiplier of greater than one to the price reached at auction.88  
Indeed, both Kremer and Shavell and van Ypersele argue that 
inventors do not reap the full social benefit of their inventions 
under a simple buy-out system (and to a lesser extent under 
the current patent system).89  The multiplier of Kremer’s sys-
tem includes a fixed markup to roughly cover the difference be-
tween the social and private values of inventions.90  Therefore, 
Kremer’s proposal can be seen as an addition to the patent sys-
tem characterized by shorter term and enhanced financial re-
ward that may not be inconsistent with the commercialization 
theory.91  It could not work, however, without the patent sys-
 
 88. See KREMER, supra note 11, at 16-18; see also SHAVELL & VAN 
YPERSELE, supra note 10, at 1.  Kremer makes this multiplier suggestion in an 
effort to help ensure that the level of incentive provided more closely approxi-
mates the social value of the invention.  See KREMER, supra note 11, at 16-18; 
see also SHAVELL & VAN YPERSELE, supra note 10, at 1.  Although his sugges-
tion is motivated by concerns that the incentives provided to a patentee under 
the patent system are too low because of dead-weight loss, the suggestion may 
also be responsive to a decrease in incentives caused by shorter term.  See id.  
Regardless of motivation, the enhanced price would serve to add the appropri-
ate incentive to inventors without distorting the auction process because it 
would be paid by the government in the buy-out cases but not by bidders in 
the consummated sales cases. 
 89. See KREMER, supra note 11, at 16-18; see also SHAVELL & VAN 
YPERSELE, supra note 10, at 1; id. at 5-6 (describing the inadequate incentive 
facing investors because even monopoly profits are likely to be less than the 
total social surplus generated by the invention). 
 90. An important contribution of Kremer’s model is the conclusion that 
inventors do not reap the full social benefit of their inventions under either a 
simple buy-out system or the current patent system.  See supra text accompa-
nying note 28.  It is for this reason that Kremer includes in his buy-out system 
a fixed markup to roughly cover this difference between the social and private 
values of inventions.  See KREMER, supra note 11, at 1-5.  Under Kremer’s 
proposal, the market value of the patents would be determined through auc-
tionhe proposes a sealed-bid second-price auction to prevent collusion to in-
crease priceand then the government would offer to buy patents at this pri-
vate value times some constant markup, which would reflect the typical ratio 
of social to private value.  See id. at 16-18. 
 91. Lichtman offers an alternative addition to the system in which the 
government offers a cash subsidy to any consumer who values a patented good 
above marginal cost but is unwilling or unable to pay to such a price.  Douglas 
Gary Lichtman, Pricing Prozac: Why the Government Should Subsidize the 
Purchase of Patented Pharmaceuticals, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123, 124-25 
(1997).  This proposal, however, faces the distortion and implementation con-
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tem operating in the first few years of patent term for those 
patents bought out by the government and operating full term 
for those patents for which the auction is consummated. 
Thus, the commercialization view of the patent system re-
veals how the patent system is superior to the proposed reward 
and buy-out systems in both promoting invention commerciali-
zation and in deciding which inventive activities are eligible to 
receive some government-conferred benefit.  Nevertheless, 
sponsors of the proposed alternatives to the patent system have 
responded to concerns about several important perceived short-
comings of the system that must be addressed.  As discussed in 
the sections that follow, the commercialization view of the pat-
ent system also reveals how the current system obviates the 
concerns that motivated critics of the system in a way that is 
squarely consistent with core theories of property rights. 
II.  PATENTS FOR COMMERCIALIZATION WITHOUT 
UNDERUSE 
The power to restrict use that drives the incentives for 
commercialization discussed in the previous section also gives 
rise to the central concern that motivated critics of the system: 
too little use may result.  More particularly, this concern takes 
three forms.  First, rights of exclusion in inventions will clog 
social ordering and bargaining around inventions.  Second, the 
power over price conferred by a right to exclude may result in 
the creation of an overall dead-weight loss for society.  Third, 
enforcement of the right to exclude might be better adminis-
tered through a liability rule, rather than a property rule.  The 
following sections address each of these concerns in turn. 
A. PROPERTY RIGHTS TO AVOID UNDERUSE 
The creation of a property right to exclude others from par-
taking in the benefits of commercialization efforts is consistent 
with the basic thesis of Demsetz that property rights emerge 
when it becomes economically efficient to internalize benefits 
and costs.92  His most cited example is the emergence of prop-
erty rights in land among Labradorian Indians as a response to 
overhunting.93  As Demsetz explains, after the creation of prop-
 
cerns generally raised against subsidies. 
 92. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. 
REV. 347, 354 (1967). 
 93. See id. at 351-53 (asserting that a rise in demand for fur relative to 
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erty rights, “an owner, by virtue of his power to exclude others, 
can generally count on realizing the rewards associated with 
husbanding the game and increasing the fertility of his land.”94 
While most often this example is cited as a problem of 
overuse, the tragedy of the Demsetz example can also be seen 
as one of underuse, or underproduction.  The inability to cap-
ture a sufficient benefit from an asset may dissuade anyone 
from incurring costs necessary to make use of that asset.  To 
the extent the asset is an input to the downstream production 
of something else, then the problem can be characterized as one 
of underproduction.  In the case of inventions, the problem can 
be viewed as both underuse of the invention and the resulting 
underproduction of commercial embodiments.95 
The notion that underuse may arise from a commons has 
been debated.  Posner and Michelman, for example, have ar-
gued about whether property rights in crops increase agricul-
tural production.96  But while recognizing that the historical re-
cord does not strictly provide a resolution to the question, 
Ellickson has pointed out that “no group in human history has 
ever treated cultivated crops as an open-access resource that 
any passerby could harvest.”97 
Heller provides another example that he calls “Poach 
Pond.”98  According to this example, underfishing of a pond may 
occur if the rule were that any community member could ap-
propriate fish until the moment of consumption because people 
 
supply prompted Labradorian Indians to create exclusive hunting territories). 
 94. Id. at 356. 
 95. Such underuse and underproduction may not appear at first glance to 
be linked to the problem of overuse most often associated with Demsetz.  How-
ever, as in his example, the underuse of some assets may cause a society to 
fully deplete its supplies of other assets.  See id. at 351-53.  In his example, the 
underuse of animal husbanding and land management resources (skills and 
labor) led to near exhaustion of animal resources (food and clothing).  See id.  
It was the institution of a right to exclude that provided incentives for indi-
viduals to make more use of the one set of resources in order not to waste, and 
indeed to replenish, the other. 
 96. The debate is summarized in Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 
102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1398-99 (1993) (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW 32 (4th ed. 1992); Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics, 
and the Law of Property, in ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW: NOMOS XXIV 
25-27 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1982)). 
 97. Ellickson, supra note 96, at 1399 (citing Martin J. Bailey, Approximate 
Optimality of Aboriginal Property Rights, 35 J.L. & ECON. 183, 185 (1992)). 
 98. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the 
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 675 (1998) [herein-
after Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons]. 
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might prefer to wait on shore and poach the catch of others 
rather than invest in fishing themselves.99  Heller provides this 
example in his important paper on a topic he calls the tragedy 
of the anticommons.100  His thesis is that when too many own-
ers hold rights of exclusion in a resource, the resource is prone 
to underuse.101  Heller’s anticommons approach may suggest an 
analytical problem for patents.  The possibility of numerous 
patents exerting a right to exclude over a single marketable 
item102 certainly evokes an anticommons image, and Heller and 
Eisenberg have argued that patents on gene fragments in the 
biotechnology industry, called ESTs, do raise an anticommons 
problem.103 
Heller and Eisenberg raise an important warning about 
the potential problems of anticommons in biological research.  
It is not clear, however, that such an anticommons problem ac-
tually exists.  Furthermore, it is not clear that a shift in patent 
law would be the proper response.104  Prescribing methods for 
avoiding an anticommons tragedy, Heller himself suggests (1) 
that close-knit groups may develop informal norms to manage 
the resource effectively or (2) that we can apply the basic teach-
ings of Demsetz105 to determine how best to internalize benefits 
and costs or to concentrate benefits and costs on owners.106  As 
 
 99. Id. 
 100. See generally id. 
 101. See id. at 624. 
 102. Often several patents are simultaneously in force around the same 
commercial item.  So-called overlapping, or mutually-blocking, patents are not 
rare.  Consider, for example, a patent on a widget and a subsequent patent on 
a widget having rollersassuming that the addition of rollers to widgets was 
new and nonobvious.  If the only commercially-viable version is one having 
rollers, then both patentees will be able to prevent the making, using, and sell-
ing of the commercial product.  Because the patent right is only the right to 
excludeand confers no affirmative right to useeven the two patentees are 
unable to make widgets of the rolling variety without permission from each 
other. 
 103. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 699-700; see also Michael A. 
Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1174-75 
(1999) [hereinafter Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property]. 
 104. Indeed, Heller & Eisenberg discuss reach-through technology license 
agreements as a very pointed non-patent example of behavior that may lead to 
anticommons.  See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 699.  They explain 
that routinely voluntarily contracting into a dynamic web of contract claims on 
each other’s research laboratories may create assets that no one will develop 
or buy because too many stakeholders exist.  Id.  Like the cause, the remedy 
for such a problem may lie entirely in contractual arrangements. 
 105. See Demsetz, supra note 92. 
 106. See Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons, supra note 98, at 677-78. 
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already discussed, it is precisely the Demsetz analysis that 
suggested property rights in inventions in the first place. 
Heller and Eisenberg may view the anticommons problem 
as one of underproduction; they may see patents on ESTs caus-
ing underproduction of downstream innovations in genetic re-
search.107  Yet, as previously stated, both the Demsetz problem 
and the basic commercialization of inventions problem can also 
be characterized as ones of underproduction.  Absent the right 
to exclude, too few commercial embodiments will be produced. 
Alternatively, Heller and Eisenberg may view the problem 
as patents on inputs unduly taxing and retarding subsequent 
development or production of outputs: 
The tragedy of the anticommons refers to the more complex obstacles 
that arise when a user needs access to multiple patented inputs to 
create a single useful product.  Each upstream patent allows its 
owner to set up another tollbooth on the road to product development, 
adding to the cost and slowing the pace of downstream biomedical in-
novation.108 
It cannot be, however, that patents on inputs generally prevent 
the production of outputs.  Entire industries have come and 
gone using scores of patented inputs.  Every car is made using 
countless patented parts, fasteners, processes, and subsystems.  
Even the biological scientist manages to use a variety of pat-
ented machines, reagents, and equipment in the ordinary 
course of research.  It does not appear that Heller and 
Eisenberg would argue that producers of biological innovations 
should not have to pay the licensing fee for ordinary inputs, in-
cluding, for example, the intermittent windshield wiper subsys-
tems on the car they drive to the laboratory in the morning. 
Heller and Eisenberg may view the problem as one of 
downstream research occurring before the patentee of some 
particular input has managed to figure out a way to turn the 
more basic invention into a commercial form.  Even with ade-
quate incentives, the commercialization of a nascent invention 
may take time.  In this sense, the problem facing such commer-
cialization might be viewed as too much demand too soon.  Or 
more precisely, it might be viewed as an insufficient capacity 
for product development, marketing, packaging, or distribution.  
However, if the problem is one of insufficient resources, the so-
 
 107. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 699-700.  A downstream in-
novation is taken to be one that occurs with the benefit of an earlier innova-
tion. 
 108. Id. at 699. 
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lution would simply be to facilitate the investment of additional 
resources in the commercialization process.  We typically asso-
ciate investment with the recognition and enforcement of prop-
erty rights, rather than their abolition.109  Furthermore, we 
typically look to clear and enforceable boundaries in property 
rights to provide incentives for investment while at the same 
time giving clearance to non-infringing activities.110 
It is also possible that Heller and Eisenberg are not simply 
concerned with the need for multiple patented inputs to make a 
single output, but rather are concerned that multiple patent 
rights might overlap to cover different aspects of a single out-
put.  Yet, as with the multiple input problem, this problem has 
not been so grave as to prevent a host of industries from operat-
ing successfully.  Numerous patents simultaneously cover 
countless products sold in ordinary markets.  One difference 
that may exist between the bundling of intangible licenses to 
make a product and the bundling of tangible licensed inputs to 
make a product is that there may be a more developed market 
for tangible licensed inputs. 
Whereas the bundling of licenses may be more difficult, 
however, it is not clear that the law today would present such a 
problem for the facts Heller and Eisenberg present.  Heller and 
Eisenberg raise the problem of patents on multiple ESTs poten-
tially blocking the use of a larger DNA sequence of which they 
can be a part.111  At least as the law currently stands, there is 
little risk a patent on a small gene fragment would support a 
judgment of infringement against a larger DNA sequence, such 
as a substantial portion of an entire gene. 
It is important to properly frame the issues facing EST 
patents.  Curiously, the criticism of patents on ESTs is often 
phrased as lack of “utility.”112  Yet, there can be no output-
restraining effects of a patent on something useless.  Consider 
 
 109. See, e.g., generally Richard Epstein, A Clear View of the Cathedral: 
The Dominance of Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091 (1997). 
 110. See generally id. 
 111. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 699.  ESTs are only small 
fragments of full-length genes.  They are usually not useful in making the 
product that is encoded by the gene and instead are often used as tags, or 
markers, to identify whether a particular gene is present.  Id.  Typically, the 
full-length gene, or a substantial portion of it, is needed to make the product 
encoded by that gene.  For most pieces of DNA, their biological significance is 
due mostly to the product they encode. 
 112. See Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, supra note 103, at 
1174-75. 
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the awkwardness facing a defendant in an infringement action 
who argues that despite practicing the claimed invention, 
which presumably gave rise to the suit, the patent is invalid 
because the invention lacks utility.113 
The proper argument for the defendant is that the larger 
piece of DNA does not infringe the EST claim.  If the patentee 
attempts to argue that the claim to the smaller fragment does 
cover the fragment within the environment of the larger DNA, 
then the defendant’s proper argument is that the claim is inva-
lid over the prior art or for lack of adequate disclosure.  For a 
patent to be valid, the claimed subject matter must be new, 
nonobvious, and the patent application must disclose the metes 
and bounds of the claimed subject matter with physical and 
chemical detail as well as how to make and use it.114  ESTs ex-
ist in nature in the company of the other DNA of the genome.  
Thus, to overcome this prior art, a typical EST claim must be 
limited to a version of the EST in some specific environment 
other than its natural one, such as isolated from all other DNA 
or inserted into an artificially engineered piece of DNA.  Also, 
to satisfy the disclosure requirements, the details of the degree 
of isolation or of the engineered piece of DNA must also be pro-
vided.  To put it another way, a patent claim directed to a gene 
fragment like an EST cannot be construed to cover larger DNA 
sequences like a substantial portion of an entire gene without 
being held invalid over the prior art or invalid for inadequate 
disclosure.115  More simply, a patent on an EST will not pre-
clude the use of an entire gene. 
 
 113. As I have argued in other work, it is not even clear that the patent 
system needs a separate utility requirement.  See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 2, 
at 744-45.  There is no harm, and may be some benefit, to granting a patent on 
a useless invention.  A patent on a purportedly useless invention that has 
many infringers must cover an invention that really is quite useful after all.  If 
the invention really is useless, then no one will want to practice it.  As a re-
sult, a useless patent does not prevent anyone from doing what he or she 
would like to doa useless patent will never be infringed.  A useless patent 
can even have benefits.  If the lack of utility is absolute, then the patent 
teaches others what not to do.  If the lack of utility is really just a lack of some 
practical application, then the patent has still contributed to the public store-
house of basic knowledge.  Id.  Furthermore, the commercialization view 
shows why the patent will actually help by providing incentives for coordi-
nated efforts to develop such practical applications. 
 114. See infra notes 170-71 and accompanying text. 
 115. See S. Leslie Misrock & Stephen S. Rabinowitz, The Inventor’s Gam-
ble: Written Description and Prophetic Claiming of Biotechnology Inventions, 
in CHISUM ET AL., supra note 2, at 331. 
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Nevertheless, a patent on an EST should allow the pat-
entee to exclude use of that particular EST in isolation or in an 
engineered construct.  This raises an important concern eluci-
dated in an earlier work by Eisenberg in which she suggests 
that in science, organized skepticism, or the need to scrutinize 
scientific claims, requires that we permit under patent law the 
use of a patented invention simply to verify scientific claims by 
the patentee.116  To the extent that the anticommons tragedy 
does operate, its impact would be particularly pernicious where 
the need to use is motivated by the mere need for scientific 
verification.  Heller’s first proposed solution to the potential 
tragedy may provide complete relief in this case.  Heller sug-
gests that close-knit groups may develop informal norms to 
manage an anticommons resource effectively.117  Federal grant-
ing organizations or state licensing boards could require re-
searchers in the basic sciences to grant limited nonexclusive in 
personam licenses in all inventions to all colleagues, but lim-
ited to use in verification only.118  Alternatively, collective-
rights groups could be organized, like the artists-rights groups 
ASCAP and BMI in the copyright context, in order to facilitate 
broad based licenses for a variety of uses across the research 
sector, thereby assuaging any remaining anticommons con-
cerns.119 
 
 116. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclu-
sive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1078 (1989). 
 117. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons, supra note 98, at 677-78. 
 118. See Joseph M. Reisman, Physicians and Surgeons as Inventors: Recon-
ciling Medical Process Patents and Medical Ethics, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 355, 
397-98 (1995).  In the context of such a verification use, the defendant might 
even mount an implied license or estoppel defense based on the industry cus-
tom and affirmative statements by the patentee asserting scientific truth.  Al-
ternatively, the patentee may rationally elect to encourage multiple verifi-
ersand even challengersto endeavor to repeat or use his patented work in 
order to gain additional scientific kudos in the form of citations.  JEROME R. 
RAVETZ, SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND ITS SOCIAL PROBLEMS 245 (2d ed. 1996) 
(noting that scientists throughout time have treated reports of a scientist’s 
work, such as through journal publication, and citation thereto, as valuable 
currencies in the market for scientific kudos, and reviewing countless ingen-
ious methods scientists have developed for staking out, defending, and even 
pirating these assets).  Such reliance on citation analysis as a measure of ku-
dos is not limited to science and indeed is a topic of great interest to communi-
ties in other disciplines, such as law.  See, e.g., Symposium, Trends in Legal 
Citations and Scholarship, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 742, 746 (1996). 
 119. See Reisman, supra note 118, at 400-01.  The suggestion of licenses 
here may raise some concerns about the ability of academic science to fund 
such licenses.  Although funding is an important issue, it is distinct from the 
issue of whether patents should be available in science.  Moreover, the exis-
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Even if relief from anticommons concerns were not com-
plete in the field of biological sciences, the need for commer-
cialization incentives in this industry is uncommonly strong.  
Costs of commercialization in the biotechnology industry are 
exceptionally high—it is estimated to take over ten years and 
several hundred million dollars to bring a single drug to mar-
ket.120  Risks of commercialization in the biotechnology indus-
try are also exceptionally high—only a minute fraction of all 
compounds that reach clinical trials successfully complete trials 
and make it all of the way to market.121  Moreover, these costs 
 
tence of commercial markets for countless scientific instruments, reagents, 
and other inputs that are covered by patents demonstrates that the patents 
are not incompatible with basic science. 
 120. Exact numbers vary among estimates.  See, e.g., STANDARD & POOR’S, 
INDUSTRY SURVEYS: BIOTECHNOLOGY 16-17  (Aug. 28, 1997) (“[M]ost new 
products cost between $200 million and $350 million to fully develop.”); Joseph 
A. DiMasi, Cost of Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 10 J. HEALTH 
ECON. 107, 125-26 (1991) (estimating an average of twelve years and $231 mil-
lion cost for drug research and development); Veronica Henry, Problems with 
Pharmaceutical Regulation in the United States: Drug Lag and Orphan Drugs, 
14 J. LEGAL MED. 617, 617 (1993) (reporting that it costs “approximately $231 
million and takes approximately ten to twelve years to develop a new drug in 
the United States”); J. Casey McGlynn & Grant Heidrich, Biotech Financing 
Remains a Tough Row to Hoe, 13 BIO/TECH. 638, 639 (1995) (estimating bio-
technology research and development at over $200 million per product); 
George Anders, Vital Statistic: Disputed Cost of Creating a Drug, WALL ST. J., 
Nov. 9, 1993, at B1, B5 (citing an Office of Technology Assessment report that 
the cost of bringing a new drug to market is $194 million after accounting for 
tax deductions for research and development); Geoffrey Carr, A Survey of the 
Pharmaceutical Industry: The Alchemists, ECONOMIST, Feb. 21, 1998, at 4 of 
insert (reporting estimate of $300 million to develop a new drug); Shawn 
Tully, You’ll Never Guess Who Really Makes . . ., FORTUNE, Oct. 3, 1994, at 
124, 128 (“Bringing a drug to market takes about twelve years.”); Interview 
with Alan Walton, BIOVENTURE VIEW, Jan. 1, 1998, available in 1998 WL 
9219211 (“On average, it takes a new drug 6.1 years in discovery, 6.9 years in 
clinical development, and 2.3 years waiting for FDA review before approval.”).  
Furthermore, few of the drugs that actually reach the market ever recover the 
costs of research and development.  H.G. Grabowski & J.M. Vernon, A New 
Look at the Return and Risks to Pharmaceutical R&D, 36 MANAGEMENT SCI. 
804, 804-821 (1990) (reporting that for the period of 1980-1984, only three out 
of ten drugs that are brought to market cover development costs after taxes 
and that 20% of the products with the highest revenues generated 70% of the 
profits); F.M. Scherer, Pricing, Profits, and Technological Progress in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 106 (1993) (estimating that 
55% of industry profits came from the top ten drugs). 
 121. Richard G. Halliday et al., R&D Philosophy and Management in the 
World’s Leading Pharmaceutical Companies, 2 J. PHARMACEUTICAL MED. 139, 
139-54 (1992) (reporting that only one out of five thousand compounds synthe-
sized during clinical trials eventually reached the market); Henry, supra note 
120, at 617 (“For every 10,000 drug candidates created in the lab only 1000 
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and risks are unique to the first mover because marginal cost 
in this industry is also uncommonly low when compared to ini-
tial commercialization costs.122  According to the commerciali-
zation view offered in this Article, it is precisely this combina-
tion of high initial commercialization costs and risks facing the 
first mover and low marginal costs facing a second mover that 
makes the biotechnology industry a particularly strong candi-
date for patent protection.  In fact, since the changes in appli-
cable patent law beginning around 1980 that are the focus of 
patent critics, such as the availability of patent protection for 
living organisms and gene fragments,123 the U.S. biotechnology 
community has enjoyed particularly rapid and large advances 
in technology and overall prosperity,124 especially compared 
with the biotechnology communities of other countries that did 
 
compounds will be tested in animals to reveal their pharmacological and toxi-
cological characteristics.  Of those 1000 compounds, only one will end up on 
the pharmacist’s shelf.  Only one in five new compounds tested in humans is 
likely to reach the market.” (citing Williams & Copelan, New Drugs for 1993, 
THE CONSULTANT PHARMACIST, Mar. 1993, at 208)); Brian H. Vickery, Costs of 
Research and Patent Considerations, 8 J. ANDROLOGY S-27, S-27 (1987) (calcu-
lating that the “overall probability of a . . . newly synthesized compound reach-
ing the marketplace reaches the vanishingly small figure of less than 1:12,000 
(0.008%)”). 
 122. See, e.g., William D. Noonan, Patenting Medical Technology, 11 J. 
LEG. MED. 263, 264 (1990) (describing biological inventions as particularly 
susceptible to piracy because they exhibit high costs to develop but relatively 
low costs to replicate).  Indeed, the relatively low marginal cost in the field of 
biotechnology is recognized generally, including by the proponents of alterna-
tives to the patent system who target this feature as a reason to avoid patents.  
See supra notes 10-11.  The proponents of alternatives to the patent system 
rely on this fact of low marginal cost as a reason to avoid property rights be-
cause they assume the low marginal cost will be associated with monopoly ef-
fects.  Yet, as discussed infra in Part II.B, the existence of substitutes will 
likely prevent patents from having monopoly characteristics, and the ability to 
price discriminate will likely prevent any patents that do exhibit monopoly 
characteristics from causing a restriction in output and the commensurate 
dead-weight loss.  Moreover, as discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 
218-19, this low marginal cost in the face of large average cost is exactly what 
makes a compelling need for the commercialization incentives that patents 
provide. 
 123. See, e.g., Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 699 (criticizing the use 
of patents on living organisms and gene fragments since the 1980 landmark 
Supreme Court decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980), 
which held that living organisms are not per se unpatentable). 
 124. See generally OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, 
BIOTECHNOLOGY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 1-33 (1991) (reviewing changes in the 
“new biotechnology,” which refers to the industrial use of recombinant DNA, 
cell fusion, and bioprocessing techniques that did not come into regular use 
until around 1980 or thereafter). 
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not readily adopt such changes in applicable patent law as 
quickly as the United States, if at all.125 
Furthermore, the large risks of commercialization in the 
biotechnology industry also provide a particularly strong incen-
tive for patentees in this industry to license broadly as a 
method for reducing risk.  Licensing to hedge risk makes sense 
because once a firm becomes competent in pursuing one avenue 
of development, the firm may have difficulty keeping track of 
other potential avenues.126  Indeed, the use of joint ventures 
and other licensing strategies to reduce commercialization risk 
in the biotechnology industry is well recognized.127 
Therefore, rather than becoming clogged, social ordering 
and bargaining around inventions will operate better if inven-
tions are subject to the property right of a patent.  Without the 
property right acting to concentrate benefits and costs on own-
ers, too few individuals will invest in making use of inventions 
to bring them to commercial fruition.  The popular foil raised 
against property rights in inventions is that they will unduly 
tax or retard use in subsequent scientific endeavors.  As ex-
plored above, however, the concerns raised by such a foil are il-
lusory.  The existence of commercial markets for countless sci-
entific inputs that are covered by patents demonstrates that 
the patent right to exclude does not necessarily prevent scien-
tists from getting access to and using inputs for scientific re-
search.  In addition, at least for the example of patents on 
ESTs, patent law’s validity rules operate to prevent patents on 
many such basic inventions from reaching much of the down-
stream research as well as most commercial products.  Fur-
thermore, the relatively small size of the academic science 
community suggests that informal norms may evolve to man-
 
 125. See generally Iain Cockburn et al., Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnol-
ogy, in U.S. INDUSTRY IN 2000: STUDIES IN COMPETITIVE PERFORMANCE 363, 
389-92  (David C. Mowery ed., 1999), available at http://www.nap.edu/open 
book/0309061792/html/363.html (reviewing and explaining reasons for the 
relative performance of the United States biotechnology industry). 
 126. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics 
of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 873 (1990) (discussing empirical ex-
plorations and citing R. NELSON & S. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF 
ECONOMIC CHANGE 389 (1982)); see also Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare 
and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF 
INVENTIVE ACTIVITY II: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 618-19 (1962) 
(noting the importance of multiple avenues of research stemming from a single 
item of information where the particular utility of that information is uncer-
tain). 
 127. See, e.g., Carr, supra note 120, at 5 of insert. 
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age any anticommons concerns that do exist.  Even if relief 
from anticommons concerns were not complete, however, the 
need for commercialization incentives in this industry is un-
commonly strong in the field of biological sciences. 
Although the right to exclude does not appear to raise un-
due concerns specific to academic science, a more general con-
cern levied against patents relates to the power over price that 
may be conferred by such a right to exclude.  Power over price 
is generally considered to create a dead-weight loss for soci-
ety.128  As described in more detail in the following section, the 
ability for the patentee to engage in price discrimination may 
avoid such dead-weight loss. 
B. PRICE DISCRIMINATION TO AVOID DEAD-WEIGHT LOSS 
The creation of a property right in inventions is also con-
sistent with another basic work by Demsetz in which he dem-
onstrated that (1) private producers can produce public goods 
efficiently given the ability to exclude nonpurchasers and (2) 
price discrimination is consistent with competitive equilibrium 
for such public goods.129  Inventions and their commercializa-
tion express prototypical attributes of public goods. 
Public goods have two characteristics: they are nonrival 
and nonexclusive.  A good is nonrival if consumption by one 
person does not leave any less of the good to be consumed by 
others.130  In microeconomic terms, a good is nonrival if for any 
given level of production, the marginal cost of providing it to an 
additional consumer is zero.  A good is nonexclusive if people 
cannot be excluded from consuming it.  In addition to informa-
tion, national defense, television signals, and police protection 
are generally considered to be further examples of public goods.  
The two distinctive features of public goods—nonrival and non-
exclusive—suggest that public goods will tend to be underpro-
duced or not produced at all. 
Inventions and their commercialization are nonrival in 
that their use by one person does not leave any less to be used 
 
 128. Dead-weight loss represents a net decrease in societal wealth.  For a 
basic explanation of dead-weight loss, see supra note 22. 
 129. Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J.L. & 
ECON. 293 (1970). 
 130. Recall Thomas Jefferson’s letter to Isaac McPherson, wherein Jeffer-
son wrote that “[h]e who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself 
without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light 
without darkening me.”  Letter from Thomas Jefferson, supra note 2, at 1291. 
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by another.  This nonrival nature of inventions is tied very 
closely to one of the central concerns expressed by critics of the 
patent system.  After invention, the marginal cost of production 
for each subsequent use of the invention is very low, even ap-
proximating zero in most cases.  Yet the patentee must charge 
at least average cost—which includes fixed costs of inventing 
and commercializing—in order to break even.  The right to ex-
clude gives the patentee potential power over price, permitting 
him to charge above marginal cost and thereby potentially cre-
ating dead-weight loss.131  It is the elimination of this dead-
weight loss that motivates the criticisms of the patent system 
discussed earlier.132 
Absent patent protection, inventions and their commer-
cialization are also nonexclusive.  To be sure, self-help mecha-
nisms may operate to give some level of exclusivity to some in-
ventions.  Each of these self-help mechanisms has limitations.  
For example, secrecy is not feasible for some inventions, such 
as those easily reverse-engineered.  In addition, breach of se-
crecy can benefit the entire world of competitors, including 
those not complicit in the breach and therefore whose use 
would not be actionable.  Similarly, limiting contract provisions 
may operate to give some cause of action against contracting 
parties but will only reach those with privity of contract.  
Moreover, neither secrecy nor contract limitations will operate 
against independent creation. 
The patent system operates by creating a legal form of ex-
clusivity.  Importantly, as Demsetz makes clear, the dead-
weight loss ordinarily associated with exclusivity can be 
avoided by price discrimination.133  One method of price dis-
crimination suggested by Demsetz is the tying of a public good 
with a private good that is excludable.134  Indeed, Demsetz 
shows that private producers of public goods may simply create 
this type of linking themselves as a method for funding the 
 
 131. The creation of dead-weight loss from pricing above marginal costs can 
best be seen in the context of monopoly pricing.  For a basic explanation of 
dead-weight loss, see supra note 22.  A more thorough, but easily readable de-
scription can be found in PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 56, at 333-52.  
The reader with a taste for higher math and multivariate calculus may prefer 
the teachings in BRIAN R. BINGER & ELIZABETH HOFFMAN, MICROECONOMICS 
WITH CALCULUS 375-85 (1988), or HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
79-95 (1984). 
 132. See supra text accompanying notes 27-46. 
 133. See Demsetz, supra note 129, at 310-12. 
 134. Id. at 306. 
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public good’s production.135  For example, Demsetz explains two 
types of tie-ins for the provision of radio and television broad-
casting: a tie to advertisers who want viewer attention and will 
pay for commercial air time or a tie to set manufacturers who 
would want to support popular shows to foster demand for 
sets.136  But such ties are not always possible under given mar-
ket and technological conditions absent the legal right to ex-
clude afforded by a patent. 
It may seem that a governmentally created patent right 
would be antithetical to Demsetz in view of his conclusion that 
because such tie-ins may be available mechanisms by which the 
private sector can produce public goods, it is imprudent to look 
first to government for public good production.137  He does rec-
ognize, however, that such a tie-in mechanism may not lend it-
self to the efficient production of some public goods.  Indeed, 
even his suggested tie-in scheme may face a free rider problem 
between the two sources of funding.  Set manufacturers may 
underrepresent their interest in having good shows knowing 
that the advertisers will have a strong interest in keeping 
something on the air that holds the attention of the audience.  
Set producers may not even care whether audiences prefer pro-
grams, informative advertisements, or amusing advertise-
ments, as long as they want to buy sets. 
The patent system offers Demsetz a minimal form of gov-
ernment intervention for facilitating tie-ins, at least less than 
would be required for government production and commerciali-
zation of inventions, which were the target of his criticism.138  
Under the patent system, the potential for tie-ins comes from 
the patentee’s right to exclude for direct infringement as well 
as contributory and induced infringement.  The creation of such 
a legal ability to tie-in would operate to enable tie-ins where 
technological and economic factors alone might make ties diffi-
cult, and would generally broaden the range of tie-ins possible.  
Thus, a patent system that facilitated appropriate tie-ins would 
theoretically operate to allow private commercialization of in-
ventions without the creation of dead-weight loss. 
Although perfect price discrimination is impossible, it may 
also not be necessary because the extent of a patentee’s power 
 
 135. See id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See id. 
 138. See id. 
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over price may be otherwise limited.  More specifically, patents 
may not give a great deal of monopoly or even market power.  
Patents often do not define markets.139 Markets order them-
selves around consumer demand—producers sell what consum-
ers will buy.  In general, consumers buy to satisfy their needs 
or desires.  In the context of a particular consumer problem, 
like mouse infestation, for example, consumers need or want 
solutions, and producers sell these solutions, perhaps in the 
form of mouse traps or cats.  A patentee can exclude others 
from making, using, selling, or offering for sale a particular in-
vention.  In a market for solutions, a patentee can prevent oth-
ers from selling a certain solution, though not all solutions, to a 
given problem.  For example, people will buy better mousetraps 
only if they cost less than cats, accounting for all costs and 
benefits such as cat food and companionship. 
As Kitch has pointed out, patented inventions also face the 
competitive pressures of time.140  Early in life, the patented in-
vention faces competition from the very technologies it has ren-
dered obsolete.  For example, older technologies may be some-
what less effective but still be cheaper, in price or total cost of 
use.  Similarly, changes in related industries can make the 
formerly obsolete technologically or economically superior to 
 
 139. For precisely this reason, Justice Clark writing for the Supreme Court 
noted, 
To establish monopolization or attempt to monopolize . . . it would 
then be necessary to appraise the exclusionary power of the . . . pat-
ent claim in terms of the relevant market for the product involved.  
Without a definition of that market there is no way to measure [the 
patentee’s] ability to lessen or destroy competition.  It may be that the 
[patented] device . . . does not comprise a relevant market.  There 
may be effective substitutes for the device which do not infringe the 
patent. 
Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177-
78 (1965).  Dam has similarly noted, 
Indeed, it became conventional to say that a patent is a monopoly.  
Nonetheless, it is readily apparent that the right to exclude another 
from “manufacture, use, and sale” may give no significant market 
power, even when the patent covers a product that is sold in the mar-
ket.  Indeed, without the benefit of empirical research, it is entirely 
plausible to conclude that in the great bulk of instances no significant 
market power is granted.  We must bear in mind that leading compa-
nies may obtain 1,000 or more patents in a single year, and yet many 
such firms are unlikely ever to obtain even a single monopoly in any 
market. 
Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 247, 249-50 (1994) (citations omitted). 
 140. See Edmund W. Kitch, Patents: Monopolies or Property Rights?, 8 RES. 
L. & ECON. 31, 31 (1986). 
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the new technology.  Later in life, the patented invention may 
face competition from even newer inventions.  Most impor-
tantly, patent term is limited to about seventeen years on aver-
age,141 and upon expiration, the patentee will face competition 
over the invention itself. 
To be sure, under the right circumstances, the case of a 
patented drug may provide an example of a market having a 
sufficient barrier to entry to be a monopoly.  The patent term 
and the state of the evolving art would have to be such that 
there exists a certain class of patients having such an acute ill-
ness that they are unable to wait for the development of alter-
native noninfringing solutions or for patent expiration.  In this 
case, the limited market at this time and for these patients is a 
monopoly.  Price discrimination may be a particularly impor-
tant tool for eliminating dead-weight loss in such markets.142  
Moreover, as Demsetz recognized, any remaining dead-weight 
loss in the static analysis may still be a worthwhile sacrifice in 
return for the gains from enhanced output of invention com-
mercialization in the dynamic analysis.143 
The dead-weight loss potentially caused by a patent right 
to exclude may loom ominously before commentators on the 
patent system, but its menace is merely phantasmal.  Concerns 
about dead-weight loss do not provide a proper motivation for 
seeking alternatives to the system.  Most patents fail to give 
any significant market power, especially not monopoly power.  
Even if a perfect monopoly were associated with a patented 
 
 141. See infra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 142. The ability to charge each patient exactly her reserve price, above 
which she would not pay, would provide the seller with a strong financial in-
centive to find and sell to each patient.  If price discrimination is available, the 
seller has a strong financial motivation to increase output to the same levels 
as under a competitive market.  To be sure, such price discrimination requires 
the ability to prevent arbitrage among patients, such as through enforceable 
contract terms against resale.  In addition, consumer subsidies may provide 
another solution.  See Lichtman, supra note 91, at 126-30. 
 143. See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 
12 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 (1969) (critiquing the so-called nirvana approach in favor 
of a comparative institution approach).  Demsetz notes that Arrow’s indivisi-
bility problem may be handled best by a private property system that reduces 
the cost of contracting and raises the cost of free loading while simultaneously 
providing incentives for investment.  See id. at 14 (critiquing Arrow, supra 
note 126, at 609-25).  Even critics of the use of price discrimination when un-
connected to intellectual property rights recognize its important beneficial im-
pact when used in conjunction with intellectual property rights.  See Wendy J. 
Gordon, Intellectual Property as Price Discrimination: Implications for Con-
tract, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1367, 1375 (1998). 
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product, the patent system gives the patentee a strong financial 
incentive to avoid the dead-weight loss typically associated 
with monopolies.  The ability to price discriminate gives the 
patentee incentive to elect not to restrict output by allowing the 
patentee to profit for each additional unit of output sold, up to 
the same total level of output that would be sold in a competi-
tive market. 
C. PROPERTY RULES TO AVOID UNDERUSE 
Simply deciding that patents should be property rights 
does not necessarily settle the question of whether they should 
be enforced as property rules rather than liability rules.144  An 
entitlement enjoys the protection of a property rule if the law 
condones its surrender only through voluntary exchange.145  
The holder of such an entitlement is allowed to enjoin in-
fringement.146  An entitlement has the lesser protection of a li-
ability rule if it can be lost lawfully to anyone willing to pay 
some court-determined compensation.147  The holder of such an 
entitlement is only entitled to damages caused by infringe-
ment.148 
A recent article by Ayres and Klemperer essentially advo-
cates a liability rule for patents by suggesting that, like a sys-
tem of compulsory licenses, a patent litigation system charac-
terized by uncertainty and delay but increased patent term 
may provide adequate incentives for patentees while reducing 
the distortionary effects of an absolute right to exclude.149  Al-
though the argument presented by Ayres and Klemperer is in-
sightful, there are several reasons that only property rules are 
appropriate for patents. 
Under the commercialization view of patents, there are a 
number of parties who want to and must be able to contract 
over patent rights.  For example, complete transferability is 
important to ensure that commercialization is conducted by the 
lowest cost provider.  Similarly, varying degrees of licensing 
 
 144. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability 
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 
1092 (1972). 
 145. See id. at 1105. 
 146. See id. 
 147. See id. at 1105-06. 
 148. See id. 
 149. See Ayres & Klemperer, supra note 8, at 992 (criticizing the crispness 
of the present patent system). 
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must occur to facilitate price discrimination.  But the costs of 
such transactions increase with uncertainty in enforcement.  
As recognized by Haddock, McChesney, and Speigel, the poten-
tial infringements induced by a liability rule will discourage in-
vestments in the invention ex ante.150  Especially in the case of 
a large number of potential traders for the asset, the imposition 
of a liability rule may create a prisoner’s dilemma in which 
each player’s dominant strategy is to infringe in order to garner 
more of the potential gains from exchange for himself.151 
It is precisely because all of these players will individually 
want to come together and bargain that the costs of evaluating 
the commercialization of the invention will be less than those 
facing an inexperienced decision maker like a court.  As recog-
nized by Merges, the fact that private parties have a compara-
tive advantage over courts in valuing patents would trigger the 
imposition of a property rule rather than a liability rule under 
the Calabresi and Melamed test.152 
In the context of the Ayres and Klemperer model, in which 
each potential infringer is disciplined to not infringe too much 
now by the threat of damages in the future, the prisoner’s di-
lemma may look more like the typical overproduction problem 
that plagues a cartel.  Each infringer may calculate the impact 
of his marginal output on price without taking into account the 
output from other infringers.  Such uncoordinated acts of in-
fringement may cause collective profits—those reaped by the 
patentee directly and through damages awards from infring-
ers—to fall below the total costs of creating and commercializ-
ing the invention, resulting in a destruction of wealth.153  To 
put it another way, liability rules can be strategically abused.154 
 
 150. See David D. Haddock et al., An Ordinary Economic Rationale for Ex-
traordinary Legal Sanctions, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (1990). 
 151. See id. at 17. 
 152. See Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Prop-
erty, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2664 (1994) (citing Calabresi & Melamed, supra 
note 144).  According to Calabresi and Melamed, the inquiry requires a com-
parison of the relative costs of establishing the value of an initial entitlement.  
See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 144, at 1106-10.  A liability rule should 
be used if a collective, public, or governmental determination would be 
cheaper than a private evaluation reached by agreement of the parties.  A 
property rule should be used if the private evaluation would be cheaper.  See 
id. 
 153. As Ayres and Klemperer recognize, if there are fixed costs of entry or 
exit, or if infringers have higher marginal cost than the patentee, then market 
entry by infringers will generate extra costs for society.  See Ayres & Klem-
perer, supra note 8, at 1015.  In addition, although economic theory teaches 
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In theory, there may be some increase in term or geo-
graphic scope of the patent sufficient to compensate for this de-
struction of wealth.155  As Ayres and Klemperer recognize, 
however, the difficulties in implementing such a compensatory 
device increase with the size of the compensation required.  For 
example, patents of longer term will face increasing chances of 
losing some or all market power to newer competing technolo-
gies.156  In addition, though such compensating devices might 
serve to ensure that the patentees, individually, continue to 
face adequate incentives, they will not make up for any net de-
crease in social wealth.157  Acts of infringement may therefore 
actually lead to destruction of value.  The model presented by 
Haddock, McChesney, and Spiegel shows that the imposition of 
a property rule is therefore required in order to put the defen-
dant back in the place he would have been but for the in-
fringement, leaving him no incentive to attempt the activity in 
the first place.158 
Longer term may also create or exacerbate the potential 
anticommons problems raised by Heller and Eisenberg.159  In-
creased term for each patent substantially increases the likeli-
hood that the manufacturer of a given output will need to as-
semble larger numbers of tangible licensed patent inputs or 
intangible patent licenses.  In this sense, shorter patent term 
can be viewed as facilitating contracting by clearing the gov-
ernmental register of rights claimants more quickly than oth-
erwise.  In addition, as may happen with any form of property, 
 
that in a long run equilibrium only the most efficient producers in the most 
efficient number will remain in the market, during the relatively short time of 
patent lifeseventeen years on averagethe costs associated with “weed-
outs” are likely to be significant. 
 154. See Haddock et al., supra note 150, at 13.  Although the Ayres and 
Klemperer argument does suggest that in some cases a low level of infringe-
ment may be optimal, this amount of infringement is already available under 
the present patent system because of other areas of procedural and substan-
tive law and practice.  Concerning procedure, litigation costs may be high 
enough to prevent the patentee from seeking court intervention against an in-
fringer.  Concerning substance, the limitations on liability that are available 
to a would-be infringer through the use of the corporate form or bankruptcy 
laws, for example, may encourage acts of infringements that are essentially 
judgment proof. 
 155. See Ayres & Klemperer, supra note 8, at 1015, 1027-28. 
 156. For a discussion of the competitive pressure of time on a patentee’s 
market power, see supra text accompanying note 140. 
 157. See supra text accompanying note 153. 
 158. See Haddock et al., supra note 150, at 13. 
 159. See supra text accompanying notes 98-111. 
KIEFF.FNL 1/15/01  3:35 PM 
2001] PROPERTY RIGHTS AND PROPERTY RULES 735 
 
increasing term will also increase the possibility of fragmenta-
tion in ownership of that property itself, which may create an 
anticommons problem for both stakeholders and third parties, 
each of whom may be unable to gather permission necessary to 
realize full value of the asset from all stakeholders.160 
Indeed, the possibility of fragmented ownership presents a 
particular problem for patents.  The patent right is only a right 
to exclude, not a right to use.  In addition, each co-owner of a 
patent can decide not to exclude third parties, by giving a par-
tial assignment or license, without accounting to any other co-
owner.161  As a result, an assignment by a co-owner will dissi-
pate the entire value of the patent for all other owners.  For 
this reason, it is well recognized that co-ownership in patents 
can create a tragedy of the commons.162  Thus, the enforcement 
of the patent right with a liability rule, as compared with a 
property rule, will not only frustrate the commercialization 
goals of the system, but the commercialization aspect of the 
system makes it particularly well suited for a property rule. 
The commercialization view of the patent system therefore 
helps elucidate why the power to restrict output is paradoxi-
cally essential to providing incentives for the market to gener-
ate output.  Rights of exclusion facilitate efforts for the social 
ordering and bargaining around inventions that are necessary 
to generate output.  Concerns raised by the popular foil against 
property rights in inventions—that biotechnology patents will 
unduly tax or retard use in subsequent scientific endeavors—
are belied by the existence of commercial markets for countless 
scientific inputs that are covered by patents.  They also pale in 
comparison to the sharp need for patents in the biotechnology 
industry.  Concerns about dead-weight loss also do not provide 
a proper motivation for seeking alternatives to the system.  
Most patents fail to give any significant market power and the 
patent system’s ability to price discriminate actually gives the 
patentee strong financial incentive to elect not to restrict out-
put, thereby avoiding the dead-weight loss typically associated 
with monopolies.  Indeed, not only are property rights of exclu-
sion advantageous, they must also be enforced by a property 
rule, and not a liability rule.  The use of liability rules would 
lead to a net increase in social cost and frustrate the very ef-
 
 160. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text. 
 161. See 35 U.S.C. § 262 (1994). 
 162. See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 1228-36 (2d 
ed. 1997). 
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forts for ordering and bargaining around patents that are nec-
essary to generate output of patented inventions. 
Having reviewed how the commercialization view of pat-
ents helps elucidate why the system should function better 
than suggested alternatives, the section that follows explores 
some of the detailed operations of the system to show how func-
tionality is achieved.  The following section also reveals how 
property rights and commercialization motivated the creation 
of our current patent system. 
III.  COMMERCIALIZATION BY DESIGN 
The modern patent system provides the incentive to com-
mercialize without the creation of dead-weight loss by setting 
forth crisp and enforceable rules for determining both validity 
and infringement.  The power of the patent derives from the 
patent’s grant of a limited right to exclude.  The owner of a pat-
ent can prevent anyone from making, using, offering for sale, 
selling, or importing the patented invention for the entire term 
of the patent.163  Neither innocent copying nor independent 
origination of a patented invention provides a defense to patent 
infringement.  Although the protection afforded by patents is 
very strong, it is also short in comparison to the protection 
available for copyrights and trademarks.  In general, patents 
last for only seventeen years.164 
In addition, the patentee’s ability to conduct price dis-
crimination is based on the ability to sue or elect to license both 
 
 163. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 271 (1994).  The right to exclude is all that the 
patent gives.  See Bloomer v. McQuewan, 42 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 549  (1852) 
(“The franchise which the patent grants, consists altogether in the right to ex-
clude every one from making . . . .”).  A patent confers no right to use.  For a 
general discussion of patents and the patent grant, see CHISUM ET AL., supra 
note 2, at 2-7, and for a detailed review of the rights and limitations of the 
patent grant, see id. at 894-1030. 
 164. All patents arising out of applications that were filed before June 8, 
1995 have a patent term that spans seventeen years from the issue date of the 
patent.  Patents arising out of applications that were filed on or after June 8, 
1995, have a patent term that begins on the date the patent issues but lasts 
twenty years measured from the earliest claimed application filing date.  See 
Pub L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809, 4988-89 (1994).  The average term for 
these more recent applications will remain seventeen years because for most 
applications, there is an average of three years between filing and issuance.  
However, if the application claims the benefit of a substantially earlier filing 
date (to antedate certain prior art, for example), then the patent term may be 
much shorter.  For a brief discussion of the change from a seventeen to twenty 
year patent term, see CHISUM ET AL., supra note 2, at 898-900. 
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direct and indirect infringers and even grant restrictive li-
censes.  The patent laws give causes of action for both induce-
ment of infringement and contributory infringement and ex-
pressly allow the patentee to elect to grant a restrictive or 
unrestrictive license165 to a potential infringer without being 
guilty of patent misuse.166  For example, a patentee may pro-
vide an expensive patented machine at some low fixed cost, 
perhaps zero, but charge per use directly or through a counting 
mechanism such as through the concurrent selling at a markup 
of some low cost but unique input.167 
 
 165. An unrestrictive license allows the licensee to practice the invention 
free from suit for infringement by the patentee.  A restrictive license gives less 
than such unlimited permission, such as by restricting the amount or type of 
use. 
 166. Inducement of infringement and contributory infringement are collec-
tively referred to as two forms of indirect infringement because under both 
causes of action the defendant is accountable as an infringer for acts of in-
fringement by third parties.  See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (codifying the cause of ac-
tion for inducement of infringement); 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (codifying the cause of 
action for contributory infringement); 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (codifying the rule 
that a patentee may elect to license direct or indirect infringers without com-
mitting patent misuse); see also CHISUM ET AL., supra note 2, at 894-1030. 
 167. Such a “counters” argument was successfully made to Chief Circuit 
Judge Lurton by Frederick P. Fish (founding partner of the firm Fish, 
Richardson & Neave, predecessor to the two firms Fish & Richardson and Fish 
& Neave) in the Button Fastener Case, and ultimately led to the opinion by 
Justice Lurton (the same man) in the A.B. Dick case, also argued by Fish.  See 
Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288 
(6th Cir. 1896) (the “Button Fastener Case”); Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 
1 (1912).  The “counters” argument offered the unpatented staples sold by the 
patentee at a substantial profit as convenient proxies used to count the num-
ber of infringing uses by purchasers of the patented stapling machine—which 
was sold by the patentee at or below cost.  See Giles S. Rich, The Relation Be-
tween Patent Practices and the Anti-Monopoly Laws, 24 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 
241, 246-60 (1942) (citing Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka 
Specialty Co., 77 F. 288 (6th Cir. 1896) (opinion by Lurton, C.J.) (the “Button 
Fastener Case”), and Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912) (opinion by 
Lurton, J.)). 
Dissenting in Brulotte v. Thys from the holding that a patentee engages in 
misuse if he charges royalties that extend beyond the patent term, Justice 
Harlan provided a pointed example demonstrating the mutual gains from 
trade that are available in such a transaction: 
At the time when the Thys patent term still has a few years to run, a 
farmer who has been picking his hops by hand comes into the Thys 
retail outlet to inquire about the mechanical pickers.  The salesman 
concludes his description of the advantages of the Thys machine with 
the price tag$20,000.  Value to the farmer depends completely on 
the use he will derive from the machine; he is willing to obligate him-
self on long credit terms to pay $10,000, but unless the machine can 
substantially outpick his old hand-picking methods, it is worth no 
more to him.  He therefore offers to pay $2,000 down, $400 annually 
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The rules for determining patentability are clear.  To be 
patentable, an invention must be new.168  It must also be 
nonobvious.169  In addition, the text, or specification of a patent 
 
for 20 years, and an additional payment during the contract term for 
any production he can derive from the machine over and above the 
minimum amount he could pick by hand.  Thys accepts, and by doing 
so, according to the majority, commits a per se misuse of its patent.  I 
cannot believe that this is good law. 
Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 38 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  Indeed, 
Justice Harlan’s reasoning demonstrates that the same effect can be achieved 
if the parties merely re-label the operative term in their contract from “royalty 
payment” to “financing provision” or if they make the exchange appear to be 
one in which the patentee is providing some benefit that is in addition to the 
patent license, such as a service contract.  By giving less, the patentee might 
commit misuse. 
Justice Robin Jacob has pointed out that a savvy patentee might achieve 
the same advantageous result by including a number of successively narrow 
claims in the initial patent application.  For example, the inventor of a paint 
spray gun might also claim the use of the device to spray paint.  It would be 
much easier for such a patentee to avoid an antitrust tying complaint if he 
elected to charge for each use of the device.  Robin Jacob, Objectionable Nar-
rowness of Claim, in CHISUM ET AL., supra note 2, at 974. 
For a general criticism of the doctrine of patent misuse, see Ward S. 
Bowman, Jr., Misuse of Patents or Misuse of Patent and Antitrust Law? Ad-
dress Before the Patent, Trademark and Copyright Section of the American 
Bar Association Meeting (Aug. 14, 1974) (transcript on file with author). 
 168. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).  A patent claim is invalid for anticipation un-
der § 102 if any single available item of prior art discloses, either expressly or 
inherently, each and every limitation of the claimed invention in a manner 
sufficient to enable one skilled in the art to reduce the invention to practice.  
Thus the famous aphorism: “That which infringes, if later, would anticipate if 
earlier.”  Knapp v. Morss, 150 U.S. 221, 228 (1893).  For a detailed discussion 
of the novelty and statutory bar requirements in patent law, see CHISUM ET 
AL., supra note 2, at 335-529. 
 169. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994).  The legal test for obviousness was articulated 
by the Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966): 
Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be deter-
mined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to 
be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art re-
solved.  Against this background, the obviousness or nonobviousness 
of the subject matter is determined.  Such secondary considerations 
as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, 
etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding 
the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented.  As indicia of 
obviousness or nonobviousness, these inquiries may have relevancy. 
Id. at 17-18.  The relevant inquiry is whether the prior art as a whole sug-
gested the claimed invention, and indicated to a person having ordinary skill 
in the art a reasonable expectation of success in achieving the claimed inven-
tion.  Obviousness is like anticipation but instead of all elements of the claim 
existing in a single item of prior art, the elements may be spread among two or 
more pieces of prior art as long as they also provide that a motivation or sug-
gestion to be combined along with a reasonable expectation of success.  See In 
re Dow Chem. Co. 837 F.2d 469, 473 (Fed. Cir. 1988).  For a detailed discus-
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must (1) include a written description of the invention, (2) in-
struct as to the construction and use of the invention, (3) di-
vulge what the inventor considers the best way to use the in-
vention, and (4) conclude with one or more claims particularly 
pointing out and distinctly claiming the process or thing pat-
ented.170  The scope of the patent’s right to exclude is set by the 
claim (or claims).171 
The present crispness did not always exist for the patent 
system.  Before the 1952 Patent Act, codified as Title 35 of the 
United States Code, the patent system was much different.  On 
April 29, 1938, addressing a joint session of Congress, Presi-
dent Roosevelt requested a thorough study of what he described 
as a “concentration of economic power.”172  Congress responded 
by creating the Temporary National Economic Committee 
(“TNEC”), the purpose of which was to study “monopoly and the 
concentration of economic power . . . with a view to determin-
ing . . . [inter alia] the effect of existing . . . patent, and other 
Government policies upon competition, price levels, unemploy-
ment, profits and consumption.”173 
What followed was the gradual but systematic erosion of 
patent rights throughout the courts.  By the late 1940s courts 
were on average applying a substantially more stringent, but 
difficult to discern, test for “invention” when deciding issues of 
validity.174  The nature of the test was aptly described in the 
 
sion of the nonobviousness requirement, see CHISUM ET AL., supra note 2, at 
530-728.  For an excellent exposition of the history of the requirement, see 
George M. Sirilla, 35 U.S.C. § 103: From Hotchkiss to Hand to Rich, The Obvi-
ous Patent Law Hall-of-Famers, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 437, 458-87 (1999). 
 170. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).  For a detailed review of the disclosure re-
quirements, see CHISUM ET AL., supra note 2, at 155-334. 
 171. As Judge Rich stated, 
The U.S. is strictly an examination country and the main purpose of 
the examination, to which every application is subjected, is to try to 
make sure that what each claim defines is patentable.  To coin a 
phrase, the name of the game is the claim . . . [and] the function of 
claims is to enable everyone to know, without going through a law-
suit, what infringes the patent and what does not. 
Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1539 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995) (quoting Giles Rich, The Extent of the Protection and Interpretation 
of ClaimsAmerican Prospectives, 21 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT 
L. 497, 499, 501 (1990)). 
 172. S. DOC. NO. 75-173, at 7 (1938). 
 173. S.J. Res. 300, 75th Cong. § 2 (1938). 
 174. See Giles S. Rich, Congressional Intentor, Who Wrote the Patent Act 
of 1952?, reprinted in NONOBVIOUSNESSTHE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF 
PATENTABILITY 1:1, 1:3 (John F. Witherspoon ed., 1980) [hereinafter 
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remarks of Justice Jackson in a 1949 dissent: “[T]he only pat-
ent that is valid is one which this court has not been able to get 
its hands on.”175  In addition, the Supreme Court had virtually 
eliminated the doctrine of contributory infringement through 
aggressive use of antitrust principles and the related doctrine 
of patent misuse.176  Earlier, the doctrine of contributory in-
fringement, and the corresponding ability of patentees to elect 
to license potential contributory infringers, were available tools 
for facilitating the type of tie-in price discrimination suggested 
by Demsetz.177 
Heady with success in implementing the Lanham Trade-
mark Act a few years earlier, in 1948, the New York Patent 
Law Association enlisted Giles Rich to draft for introduction in 
Congress a bill178 to revive contributory infringement and two 
other bills179 to establish a more definite test for what consti-
tutes an “invention.”180  Legislative efforts continued into sub-
sequent Congresses, leading to the formation of a National Co-
ordinating Committee and a two-man Drafting Committee, 
including Rich, and producing extensive congressional testi-
mony from representatives of diverse groups, again including 
Rich, as representative of the Bar.181  The result was the 1952 
Act, which substantially remains as the controlling patent law 
today.182  As the Supreme Court expressly recognized almost 
 
NONOBVIOUSNESS]. 
 175. Jurgensen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (Jackson, 
J., dissenting). 
 176. See NONOBVIOUSNESS, supra note 174, at 1:3.  The doctrines of in-
ducement of infringement and contributory infringement hold a defendant ac-
countable as an infringer for acts of infringement by third parties.  See supra 
note 166.  By the late 1940s, the court had effectively eliminated contributory 
infringement by holding that such suits improperly extended the patent be-
yond the scope of the claims, thereby constituting misuse of the patent.  See 
NONOBVIOUSNESS, supra note 174, at 1:3 (citing Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-
Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis Honey-
well Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944)). 
 177. See supra text accompanying notes 129-38. 
 178. H.R. 5988, 80th Cong. (1948). 
 179. H.R. 4061, 80th Cong. (1948); H.R. 5248, 80th Cong. (1948). 
 180. See NONOBVIOUSNESS, supra note 174, at 1:3. 
 181. See id. at 1:3-1:10. 
 182. A great deal has been written about the history of the 1952 Patent 
Act.  An extensive discussion of the history and impact of the Act can be found 
in Dawson Chem. v. Rohm & Haas, 448 U.S. 176 (1980), which found no mis-
use where the holder of a patent on the method of using a chemical as a herbi-
cide charges customers above market price for the chemical itself and sues 
competing chemical company for contributory infringement.  See id. at 223; see 
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thirty years later in an opinion quoting extensively from the 
Rich testimony, § 271 of the Act revived contributory infringe-
ment through its inclusion of express provisions for contribu-
tory infringement and inducement of infringement and of ex-
press statements about what shall not constitute misuse.183 
Especially when seen in such context, the plain wording of 
the 1952 Act shows a clear shift towards a patent system 
marked by more certain and effective patent rights.  Indeed, 
the importance of commercialization to the members of the 
Patent Bar in general, and to Giles Rich, is clearly evidenced by 
other writings from the time.  As part of a competition spon-
sored by the Linthicum Foundation and chaired by Dean Wig-
more, Rich wrote what became a five-part series of articles on 
the relationship between patent and antitrust laws.184  In this 
series, Rich expressly set forth a commercialization theory of 
the patent system.185  In doing so, he provided several detailed 
examples of the underuse problem associated with the lack of 
property rights.186  It is immediately recognizable that these 
problems of underuse are caused by the inability to concentrate 
benefits and costs on owners, as described almost thirty years 
later by Demsetz.187 
 
also NONOBVIOUSNESS, supra note 174.  West published the Congressional 
Committee Reports on the 1952 Patent Act in its original annotated version of 
Title 35.  The legislative history of the 1952 Patent Act is republished along 
with the original commentary by Pasquale “Pat” Federico, the Patent Office’s 
liaison to the Drafting Committee and representative at legislative hearings 
on the Act, in 75 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 157 (1993). 
 183. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (b)-(d); see also Dawson Chem., 448 U.S. at 206-07 
(quoting extensively from and basing decision upon testimony of Giles Rich).  
For a discussion focused on the history, architecture, and operation of § 271, 
see Giles S. Rich, Infringement Under Section 271 of the Patent Act of 1952, 35 
J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 476 (1953), and Giles S. Rich, Recollections of Writing 35 
USC 271, Address at the John Marshall Conference (1981). 
 184. See Giles S. Rich, The Relation Between Patent Practices and the Anti-
Monopoly Laws (pts. 1-5), 24 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 85, 159, 241, 328, 422 (1942) 
[hereinafter Rich, The Relation Between Practices and the Anti-Monopoly 
Laws].  Rich tells the story of the competition in his famous acceptance speech 
for the Kettering Award, Giles S. Rich, The Vague Concept of “Invention” as 
Replaced by Sec. 103 of the 1952 Patent Act, 46 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 855 (1964) 
[hereinafter Rich, The Vague Concept of “Invention”], which provided the 
framework for the test of nonobviousness adopted by the Supreme Court in 
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 3 (1966). 
 185. See generally Rich, The Relation Between Practices and the Anti-
Monopoly Laws, supra note 184. 
 186. See id. 
 187. See supra text accompanying notes 92-95. 
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Rich began his discussion of patent theory by marginaliz-
ing theories of the patent system based on rewards as incen-
tives to invent or disclose because they both focus “primarily 
with reference to the ‘inventor’ as though he were the principal 
character in this economic drama.  We think this is a great mis-
take.  He may be an essential party but the emphasis should be 
placed elsewhere.”188 
Instead, Rich suggested that focus should be placed on a 
third theory: 
The third aspect of inducement is by far the greatest in practical im-
portance.  It applies to the inventor but not solely to him, unless he is 
his own capitalist. . . .  It might be called the inducement to risk an 
attempt to commercialize the invention.  It is the “business” aspect of 
the matter which is responsible for the actual delivery of the inven-
tion into the hands of the public.189 
Rich proceeded to quote at length from an editorial in Business 
Week that described the costs and risks of commercialization.190  
He continued by quoting from another editorial in Business 
Week that described a new plastic made from sawdust devel-
oped by the United States Forest Service.  The plastic made 
from sawdust was licensed freely and nonexclusively for the 
use of all, and as a result, it was not further developed.191 
He then cited a more pointed example from the health care 
industry of the inventor of a new wheelchair, who, thinking to 
give it to the world for free, did not patent it: “The result was 
that no manufacturer dared risk undertaking its manufacture.  
Each knew that if it succeeded, competitors would spring up 
and rob him of most or all of his profits, while, on the other 
hand, it might fail.”192  Rich then quoted from the Patent Com-
missioner’s testimony before the TNEC which asserted: “I think 
I can present to you indisputable evidence that speculative 
capital will not back new inventions without the patent protec-
tion.  And in the final analysis this is the crux and the most 
important thing in the whole patent question.”193 
 
 188. Rich, The Relation Between Patent Practices and the Anti-Monopoly 
Laws, supra note 184, at 175. 
 189. Id. at 177 (emphasis added). 
 190. See id. at 178 (quoting Editorial, BUS. WK., Mar. 23, 1940, at 55). 
 191. See id. at 178-79 (quoting Editorial, BUS. WK., Dec. 23, 1939, at 29). 
 192. Id. at 179 (quoting Forkosch, The Economics of American Patent Law, 
Contemp. Law. Pamph., Ser. 4, No. 2, at 21 (citing ELEMENTARY PRINCIPLES 
OF ECONOMICS 331 (1913))). 
 193. Id. at 180 (quoting TNEC Hearings, pt. 3, 857-58 (1939) (statement of 
Conrad P. Coe, Commissioner of Patents), reprinted in 21 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 
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A few years later, in an unpublished manuscript, Rich 
again explained that patents provide an incentive to invest risk 
capital for commercialization, which he considered to be “usu-
ally the most expensive part of the long haul from the mental 
conception of the invention to the delivery of something useful 
into the hands of the consumer.”194 
Rich also pointed out the importance of patent law’s rules 
for determining what inventions should be patentable.  He ex-
plained that the legal rules work together with technological 
facts knowable to all at the time a patent application is filed to 
make this determination automatic.  As he put it, 
All the talk about the strength and weakness of patents per se borders 
on gobbledygook until we learn to comprehend the riddle that: The 
stronger a patent the weaker it is and the weaker a patent the stronger 
it is.  To explain, a patent that is strong in that it contains broad 
claims which adequately protect the invention so they are hard to de-
sign around is weak in that it may be easier to invalidate and is 
therefore less likely to stand up in court because the claims are more 
likely to read on prior art or be broader than the disclosed invention, 
and for other reasons defense lawyers can devise.  On the other hand, 
the patent with narrow claims of the kind the Patent Office readily al-
lows quickly without a contest is weak as protection and as incentive 
to invest but strong in that a court will not likely invalidate it.195 
Indeed, the other major improvement included in the 1952 Act 
was the introduction of the nonobviousness requirement as an 
objective test for patentability, in addition to simple novelty, 
and instead of the more nebulous requirement that to be pat-
entable the invention had to involve “invention.”196 
Curiously, the TNEC testimony from Commissioner Coe is 
also quoted in the article that won the prize from the Linthi-
 
87, 117-18 (1939)). 
 194. Giles S. Rich, Patents Are Bait 11 (Dec. 1945) (unpublished manu-
script on file with author) (citing Judge Frank concurring with an opinion by 
Judge Hand in Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 643-44 (2d Cir. 
1942)). 
 195. Giles S. Rich, The Proposed Patent Legislation: Some Comments, 35 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 641, 644 (1967) (responding to proposed legislation S. 
1042 and H.R. 5924, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) and Report of the President’s 
Commission on the Patent System (1966)).  Grady and Alexander have further 
endeavored to show how courts have applied these rules in decisions that pro-
vide incentives to minimize inefficient rent-seeking—and thereby rent-
dissipating—behavior, thereby more efficiently organizing efforts to invent 
and commercialize among competitors in markets for such activities over time.  
See Grady & Alexander, supra note 66, at 316-21. 
 196. Not only was the requirement for invention nebulous, it was patently 
absurd, especially to the uninitiated.  Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability, 
28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 393, 403 (1960). 
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cum Foundation.197  In the foreword to the winning article, 
Dean Wigmore injects what he calls his “personal opinion that 
neither Courts nor treatise-writers have been radical enough in 
defending the legitimacy of the ‘monopoly’ in a patent, as dis-
tinguished from the ordinary trade-monopoly,” and that he re-
gards it as “unfortunate that courts and treatise-writers have 
not stood up more boldly for the fundamental right-ness of the 
patent-right itself.”198 
Rich was not the only one to appreciate the importance of 
patents.  Other commentators before the 1952 Act were even 
able to envision the more modern vision, today often associated 
with Schumpeter,199 that paradoxically, a patent in the hands 
of a market challenger may evoke competition against a huge 
industrial monopolist.  According to Judge Frank, in this con-
text the David Co. v. Goliath, Inc., competition is dependant 
upon investment in David Co., which will not occur unless it is 
armed with the patent slingshot.200  Rich later asserted this 
view of patents as potential antimonopoly agents in his com-
mentary on proposed patent legislation.201  Today, such a view 
of patents may help explain why the inability to receive patent 
protection for software for such a large and important portion 
of the industry’s life may have contributed to the continued un-
challenged dominance of a huge entity like Microsoft.202 
 
 197. LAURENCE I. WOOD, PATENTS AND ANTITRUST LAW 20 (1941). 
 198. John H. Wigmore, Foreword to LAURENCE I. WOOD, PATENTS AND 
ANTITRUST LAW vii-viii (1941). 
 199. See, e.g., SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 
supra note 53, at 61-94; SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND 
DEMOCRACY, supra note 53, at 81-110; SCHUMPETER, BUSINESS CYCLES, supra 
note 4, at 84-192. 
 200. See Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 643-44 (2d Cir. 
1942) (Frank, J. concurring). 
 201. See Rich, supra note 195, at 651 (responding to proposed legislation S. 
1042 and H.R. 5924, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) and Report of the President’s 
Commission on the Patent System (1966)). 
 202. Early in the rise of the software industry, Judge Rich attempted on 
several occasions to strike down legal rules against patenting of computer pro-
grams.  Throughout the 1970s, he sent numerous cases to the Supreme Court 
to no avail.  See generally CHISUM ET AL., supra note 2, at 763-72, 788-813 (re-
viewing efforts by Judge Rich to elucidate flaws in the Supreme Court’s efforts 
to block patents on computer software and subsequent appeals to the Supreme 
Court in those cases, eventually leading to a shift in the Court’s views to now 
allow such protection).  Finally, perhaps due in part to a shift in makeup of the 
Court, he began to have success in Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), but 
it was not until In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc), and 
perhaps even State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group Inc., 
149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999), that the 
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This controversy over the use of patents to protect subject 
matter such as living organisms, gene fragments, computer 
software, and financial services relates to perceived changes in 
the law governing the threshold patentability requirements of 
utility and statutory subject matter.203  The claimed invention 
must fall within at least one of the statutory classes of pat-
entable subject matter: products or processes.204  Although in-
terpreted expansively to “include anything under the sun that 
is made by man,”205 these classes do not encompass everything.  
A common limit on each class is the well-established aphorism 
that ideas or laws of nature are not patentable subject matter: 
though Einstein might have been able to patent a method of 
converting mass into energy, his law E = mc2, in and of itself, is 
not patentable.206  This takes us back to the utility require-
ment.207  As long as it is claimed in such a way that it performs 
some useful, concrete, or tangible result, almost any process 
will at least satisfy the threshold requirements of utility and 
statutory subject matter.208 
 
market fully responded to the availability of patent protection. 
 203. See supra note 9. 
 204. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).  Section 101 actually sets forth four specific 
categories—processes, machines, articles of manufacture, and compositions of 
matter—but law and practice have long treated the last three together as 
products. 
 205. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (citing Committee 
Reports accompanying the 1952 Patent Act, S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952) 
and H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)); see also In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 
961 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (Rich, J.) (citing the same Committee Report for the 
proposition that patentable subject matter “may include anything under the 
sun . . . made by man” (emphasis added)). 
 206. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185-91.  For a detailed review of the require-
ment for statutory subject matter, see CHISUM ET AL., supra note 2, at 752-
893. 
 207. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).  For a detailed review of the utility re-
quirement, see CHISUM ET AL., supra note 2, at 729-51. 
 208. See State St. Bank & Trust Co., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375-77 (Fed. Cir. 
1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999) (holding the hub and spoke mutual 
fund accounting system to be patent eligible subject matter because the data it 
manipulates and produces both correspond to and cause something concrete 
and tangible: a share price, which is money).  Although traditional examples of 
patented inventions include machines and chemicals, it is the more controver-
sial subjects such as genes and gene products, computer software, financial 
services, and business methods that have spurred on much of the recent criti-
cism facing patent law.  Although at one time hotly debated, it is currently 
settled as a matter of positive law that protection is available in each of these 
areas.  To be sure, the normative debate survives, and indeed thrives.  See, 
e.g., supra text accompanying note 9. 
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What emerges from this review of the writings of those in-
volved in framing our current patent system is that the com-
mercialization theory’s link among patents, property rights, 
and price discrimination clearly operated to inform and moti-
vate their efforts to frame the system.  They viewed patents 
first as incentives to commercialize nascent inventions.209  They 
recognized that patent rights must be set by clear rules of law 
governing validity and infringement.210  And they were deeply 
motivated by a desire to revive the patentee’s ability to use 
price discrimination by electing to offer either restricted or un-
restricted licenses to anyone who would otherwise be subject to 
suit for direct or indirect infringement.211  They also recognized 
the importance of patents as potential tools for avoiding or 
challenging monopolies.212 
 
 209. See supra text accompanying notes 188-198. This particular aspect of 
the commercialization view, along with use of the word “commercialization,” 
has begun to resurface over the past twenty years in statutes, legislative hear-
ings, and statements by judges.  For example, the Bayh-Dole Act, passed in 
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3018-28, § 6(a) (1980) (codified as 
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (1994)), encourages universities to seek and 
retain patent rights on the results of federally funded research for the express 
purpose of using “the patent system to promote the utilization of inventions 
arising from federally supported research or development . . . [and] to promote 
the commercialization and public availability of inventions made in the United 
States.”  35 U.S.C. § 200 (1994) (stating the purposes of the act).  Similarly, in 
hearings leading up to the Bayh-Dole Act, Harry F. Manbeck, who subse-
quently became Commissioner of the Patent and Trademark Office, argued 
that “[u]nless the universities get substantial rights from patents, there is ab-
solutely no incentive for them to establish technology transfer and patent pro-
grams which may lead to commercialization of the research.”  Patent Policy: 
Hearings on S.1215 Before the Subcomm. on Science, Technology, and Space of 
the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 96th Cong. 302 
(1979) (statement of H.F. Manbeck, Jr., General Patent Counsel, General 
Electric Co.).  See also In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1994) 
(Newman, J., concurring) (“What seems to be missing in our country is an un-
derstanding that, no matter how much money we spend on research and de-
velopment, the findings are not going to benefit the public unless there are 
suitable incentives to invest in commercialization.  That means a chance of 
reasonable profits from risk taking and a chance to hold onto one’s original 
ideas once they are created” (quoting approvingly Irving S. Shapiro, Address 
Before the Economic Club of Detroit (1979), in XLV VITAL SPEECHES OF THE 
DAY 360, 364 (1979))); Foreword, in CHISUM ET AL., supra note 2, at iii (con-
sisting of statement by Judge Giles S. Rich that probably the most important 
function of the patent system is “to encourage the investment of risk capital in 
the commercialization of inventions so that the public gets to enjoy the bene-
fits thereof”).   
 210. See supra text accompanying notes 178-87, 195-96. 
 211. See supra text accompanying notes 165-67, 178-83. 
 212. See supra text accompanying notes 199-202. 
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IV.  COMMERCIALIZATION AND THE MODERN      
PATENT SYSTEM 
The commercialization view of patents helps explain many 
controversial trends in the current patent system, including 
those that sparked the recent critical commentary.213  Under 
this view, the increases in predictability in patent litigation 
and certainty in patent law that have been attributed to the 
creation of the Federal Circuit and areas of that court’s case 
law are good things.214  They have helped forge clearly marked 
and enforceable property rules for patents.215  Similarly, under 
this view, it is also good that patents are now being used to pro-
tect subject matter such as living organisms, gene fragments, 
computer software, and financial services, which many previ-
ously considered to be ineligible for patent protection.216  This 
makes sense because some form of protection is necessary to 
permit recovery of commercialization costs in markets such as 
these,217 precisely because they are characterized by a particu-
larly large difference between average cost and marginal 
cost.218 Indeed, the need for protection is especially strong in 
markets such as these because commercialization costs repre-
sent a significant component of average cost.219 
Consider, for example, the topic of patents on financial ser-
vices.  A recent article by Van Zandt suggests that there is 
suboptimal innovation in capital markets.220  Van Zandt sug-
gests that at least one of the reasons for suboptimal innovation 
 
 213. See supra text accompanying notes 8-12. 
 214. See supra text accompanying note 8. 
 215. See discussion supra Part II. 
 216. See supra text accompanying notes 9, 203-08. 
 217. See discussion supra Parts I.A, II.A. 
 218. Contra SHAVELL & VAN YPERSELE, supra note 10, at 11 (arguing that 
the large difference between average cost and marginal cost for these tech-
nologies makes use of patents particularly harmful); KREMER, supra note 11, 
at 7 (same).  The need for patent protection is strong because first movers in 
such markets face high costs of commercialization, whereas second movers 
face only low costs of making and selling.  See discussion supra Part I.A. 
 219. In this regard, the commercialization view of patents considers the 
growth and survival of a single player with large market power in the software 
industrylike Microsoftone of only a few evolutionarily expected outcomes.  
Monopoly power provided a method for allowing the firm to recover average 
costs in the absence of patent protection.  See supra text accompanying note 
202. 
 220. See David Van Zandt, The Organization of Innovation in International 
Capital Markets 7-14 (Mar. 22, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author). 
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in this market is the high cost of creating a market combined 
with the ease of competitive copying.221  He explains that only 
the largest few players in the industry regularly bring new 
products to market.222  It is not surprising, then, that the com-
mercialization view of patents may provide an easy solution.  In 
the language of Demsetz, the threat of copying prevents the 
small firms from being able to concentrate the benefits of com-
mercialization.223  They therefore elect not to invest in commer-
cialization at all.  Only the larger players can afford to invest 
the resources to bring such products to market.  According to 
the commercialization theory, the availability of patent protec-
tion may enable small firms to enter the market, and perhaps 
even challenge their larger counterparts.224 
The commercialization view of patents may also help ex-
plain outcomes on recent legislative activity in the patent 
arena.  For example, efforts to harmonize the U.S. patent sys-
tem with those of the rest of the world frequently receive sub-
stantial attention from Congress and commentators.225  Typical 
legislative proposals have included the following: shifting pat-
ent term so it is measured as twenty years from earliest filing 
date rather than seventeen years from issue date;226 allowing 
the filing of provisional patent applications, which would estab-
lish a priority date for a low fee but would have to be converted 
to a regular application by the applicant in order to be exam-
ined;227 the publication of patent applications eighteen months 
after filing;228 and moving from a first-to-invent system to a 
first-to-file system.229 
Those suggested changes that have already been made are 
in accord with the commercialization view.  Twenty-year-term 
 
 221. See id. at 7-11. 
 222. See id. at 15-19. 
 223. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 224. See supra text accompanying notes 199-202. 
 225. See, e.g., Patent Harmonization Act of 1992, S. 2605, 102d Cong. 
(1992), H.R. 4978, 102d Cong. (1992) [hereinafter Patent Harmonization Act of 
1992]; Edward G. Fiorito, The “Basic Proposal” for Harmonization of U.S. and 
World-Wide Patent Laws Submitted by WIPO, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y. 83 (1991) (summarizing harmonization efforts of the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO), a specialized agency of the United Nations). 
 226. See Patent Harmonization Act of 1992 § 6. 
 227. See id. § 4. 
 228. See id. 
 229. See id. § 3. 
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and provisional applications were passed into law in 1994.230  
Eighteen-month-publication was passed into law in 1999.231  
Under the commercialization view, the shift in patent term can 
be seen as an aid in clearing the patent register.232  Similarly, 
eighteen-month-publication can be seen as an important signal-
ing tool for controlling the potential rent-seeking, and therefore 
rent-dissipating, behavior of those who would be lured into do-
ing inventive effort by the potential profits from a patent.233 
In contrast, the shift from a first-to-invent system to a 
first-to-file system has not yet been implemented and may not 
be in accord with the commercialization view.  In the existing 
U.S. patent system, when two or more patent applications or 
patents claim the same invention, or an application is filed 
claiming the same invention as a recently issued patent, the 
Patent and Trademark Office will commence an interference 
proceeding to determine priority of invention.234  Under a first-
to-file system, priority is awarded to the application that is 
filed first, regardless of priority of invention.235  Much of the 
 
 230. See supra note 164 (citing Pub L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994)); 
see also 35 U.S.C. § 154 (term); 35 U.S.C. § 111(b) (provisional applications). 
 231. See Pub L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (1999). 
 232. See also supra text accompanying notes 159-60.  In addition, Congress 
has established an inter partes reexamination procedure with participation by 
third parties (other than the Patent Office and the patentee) for administra-
tive adjudication of the validity of issued patents by the Patent Office as a less 
costly alternative to proceeding in Federal Court.  Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 
Stat. 1501A-567-71 (1999).  This new reexamination procedure may enhance 
the policing role played by competitors of the patentee.  See discussion supra 
Part I.B. 
 233. See, e.g., Grady & Alexander, supra note 66, at 314-16 (discussing the 
principals of “signaling,” which leads to races for patents and rent dissipation); 
see also supra text accompanying notes 66-67 (noting concern about potential 
rent-seeking behavior at the pre-invention stage). 
 234. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.601 (1999); 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1994).  The second 
party to file (the junior party) has the burden of proving prior invention by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Priority of invention is determined pursuant 
to the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 102.  The first party to conceive of the in-
vention will win the interference if she is also the first to reduce the invention 
to practice.  If she is not the first to reduce to practice, she will win the inter-
ference only if she can prove diligence in her efforts to reduce the invention to 
practice.  Reduction to practice may be either actual or constructive, through 
the filing of a patent application.  See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE § 715.07 (7th ed. 1998).  The interference practice resulting from § 
102(g) is the basis for the so-called “first-to-invent” aspect of the United States 
patent system.  For more on the priority of invention and interferences, see 
CHISUM ET AL., supra note 2, at 485-529. 
 235. See Patent Harmonization Act of 1992 § 3. 
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debate236 over first-to-file versus first-to-invent can be seen in 
context of the general debate over rules versus standards, fair-
ness versus certainty, and efficiency.237  The incentive to com-
mercialize theory may, however, provide special insight for re-
solving the particular debate applied to patents.  While one 
contestant may emerge holding the property right from a prior-
ity dispute under a first-to-invent system, a first-to-file system 
may be more likely to yield no property right at all.238  The in-
creased incentive to file early under a first-to-file system, as 
compared with a first-to-invent system, may lead to an increase 
in the number of patents being held invalid for inadequate dis-
closure in their underlying applications, thereby diminishing 
incentives to engage in commercialization activities.239  The in-
centive to commercialize view thus helps explain the persis-
tence of the existing first-to-invent regime. 
 
 236. See generally Patent Harmonization Act of 1992: Joint Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on 
the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property and Judicial Admin. 
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 2605 and H.R. 4978, 102d Cong. 
(1992) (collecting testimony and sources on both sides of the debate). 
 237. See generally MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 
15-64 (1987) (discussing the rules versus standards debate in the context of 
general legal systems and arenas). 
 238. To be sure, patentability or validity issues can be raised in priority 
disputes under both systems; the operative distinction here is that first-to-file 
systems may give rise to increased validity problems. 
 239. A hastily filed application is more likely to be found invalid for none-
nablement or lack of written description under recent Federal Circuit case 
law.  See Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co. 927 F.2d 1200, 1213-18 (Fed. Cir. 
1991) (applying the statutory requirement that the text of the patent applica-
tion as filed contain sufficient disclosure to enable one in the art to make and 
use whatever is covered by patent claims as eventually issued and applying 
separate written description requirement to claims in the field of biotechnol-
ogy); Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkur, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-67 (Fed. Cir. 1991) 
(holding that the statute also requires the text of the patent application as 
filed to satisfy the separate and distinct written description requirement so as 
to reasonably convey to those in the art exactly what is covered by the patent 
claims as eventually issued); Amgen v. Chugai, 927 F.2d 1200, 1213-18 (apply-
ing separate written description requirement to claims in the field of 
biotechnology); Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1170-71 (Fed. Cir. 1993) 
(solidifying the court’s position on a separate written description requirement); 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566-69 (Fed. 
Cir. 1997) (further solidifying the court’s position on a separate written 
description requirement); Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (applying the same written description requirement to the 
field of computer software); Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 
1437, 1479-80 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (indicating that the written description 
requirement is not limited to complex technologies but applies equally to 
simple technologies, like sofa recliners); see also supra text accompanying 
notes 115, 170. 
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V.  COMMERCIALIZATION AND THE MODERN 
TRADEMARK SYSTEM 
The commercialization theory of patent law may also help 
explain controversial aspects of trademark law.  Consider, for 
example, a trademark that has become so well known, consum-
ers now view it as a distinct good or service.  Consider that 
some consumers may even like it so much that they use it as 
decoration.  It cannot be that every customer who buys a 
Mickey Mouse shirt supposes that the quality of the shirt owes 
anything to Walt Disney Productions.  Even if the consumers 
think there is some licensing arrangement between the shirt 
seller and Disney, that arrangement may be irrelevant to the 
decision to buy. 
To make the case stronger, consider the argument by Koz-
inski about T-shirts bearing a New York Mets logo, in which he 
urges that a fan has a strong claim to express team admiration, 
and an even stronger claim to express team criticism.240  From 
there, he adds, it is only a small step to say that the fan ought 
to be able to pay someone to stencil the shirt professionally.241 
In a recent tribute symposium to the late Ralph Brown, 
Lemley and Litman argued that any trend in trademark law 
that permits the propertization of trademarkssuch as the 
merchandizing right in the sports contextis simply an im-
proper use of the law of trademarks.242  For them, the touch-
stones and the limits of trademark theory are designations of 
source and confusion.243  Lemley asserts that “it does not follow 
 
 240. See Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 
976 (1993).  For example, team admiration might be expressed by the wearing 
of a T-shirt bearing just the logo, or the logo preceded by the slogan “up with.”  
Team criticism might be expressed by wearing a T-shirt bearing a defaced 
logo, or a logo preceded by the slogan “down with,” or some inelegant version 
thereof. 
 241. Id. 
 242. See Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Com-
mon Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1705-09 (1999); Jessica Litman, Breakfast 
with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 
1717, 1728-31 (1999). 
 243. See Lemley, supra note 242, at 1705-09.  Lemley intimates reasoning 
similar to Kozinski, supra note 240: a fan or critic who is merely interested in 
speaking about the Mets cannot be confused about source because source is 
irrelevant to the decision to buy the shirt.  The purpose of buying the shirt for 
such an owner is to speak about the team.  Indeed, the presence of a licensing 
arrangement behind the shirt sale might undermine the rhetoric of, or even 
offend, the speaker if the message of the speech is critical of the team. 
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that because something is valuable it must be owned.”244  Fur-
ther, in an article that bears the running title “Breakfast with 
Batman,” Litman urges, “An argument that we would have an 
undersupply of good commercials . . . cannot be made with a 
straight face.”245 
At least the beginnings of the counterargument are found 
in the trademark dispute over Batman himself in the 1982 DC 
Comics case.246  There, Judges Rich and Nies began by pointing 
out that there is not, and should not be, any principle of trade-
mark law that requires imposition of a penalty for the original-
ity, creativeness, attractiveness, uniqueness, or even fame of 
one’s product, or that requires a holding that the unique design 
or other features of a product cannot also function as a designa-
tion of source.247  They note that the opposite rule 
has led some courts into an esoteric and extraneous inquiry focusing 
on what motivates the purchasing public to buy particular goods, the 
product itself or the source. . . . The reason the public is motivated to 
buy the product . . . is of concern to market researchers but is legally 
immaterial to the issue of whether a particular designation is ge-
neric.248   
They do recognize the safeguard that trademark 
“[p]rotectibility is lost when the public uses what was a proper 
name [the mark] to denominate like or similar goods from other 
sources as well.”249  Yet they conclude that “it would be unfor-
tunate were we to discourage use of a spark of originality which 
would transform an ordinary product into one of grace.”250 
Restructuring the discussion into the framework of Dem-
setz, the question is not whether we will see a decrease in 
commercialsalthough fans of Superbowl commercials may 
feel otherwisebut, rather, whether we will see a decrease in 
the development of highly popular marks.  Underlying the rea-
soning of Judges Rich and Nies is a recognition that trademark 
rights in such marks encourage firms to invest in promoting 
new highly entertaining marks in an effort to make them popu-
lar.  As Landes and Posner noted, if appropriation is forbidden 
by a property rule, the benefits of such popularization will be 
 
 244. Lemley, supra note 242, at 1709. 
 245. Litman, supra note 242, at 1730. 
 246. See In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1046-55 (Fed. Cir. 1982) 
(opinions of Judge Rich and Judge Nies concurring separately in result). 
 247. Id. at 1053. 
 248. Id. at 1054. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. at 1050. 
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internalized to mark owners and the amount of investing in po-
tentially famous marks will rise.251  Although this may seem 
frivolous to some, the audience who makes it happen must feel 
otherwise.  After all, they will have devoted the attention nec-
essary to make the mark so valuable.  Indeed, this may cause 
some in the audience to argue that it is precisely because of this 
investment on their part that ownership, if there is any, lies 
entirely with them.252  It would run afoul of basic principles of 
capitalism, however, to suggest that the requirement to pay for 
a good should evaporate simply because a consumer has devel-
oped a particularly strong interest in the good—particularly if 
it is a luxury good. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article offers a new view of the patent system in 
which a central goal is to facilitate commercialization of new 
goods and services.  Under this view, treatment of patents as 
property rights provides incentives for the investment and or-
dering of private activities necessary for such a complex com-
mercialization process while at the same time providing a 
workable framework for deciding which inventive activities 
merit government intervention in the first instance.  According 
to this view, patents can promote commercialization without 
creating dead-weight loss through the use of price discrimina-
tion and strict and clearly marked property rules.  In this re-
gard, this Article provides a moral realist or natural law view 
of the patent system as a legal regime getting it right. 
This Article also demonstrates how the link among pat-
ents, property rights, and commercialization informed the crea-
tion of our current patent system.  The offered view of the sys-
tem may help explain many controversial trends, including 
those that sparked recent critical commentary, as well as those 
in other areas of intellectual property law, such as trademarks.  
This Article therefore simultaneously provides support for the 
present patent system under three additional philosophical 
views.  Under an intentionalist view, the system we have today 
is in keeping with the intent of those who framed it.  Under a 
positivist view, the system we have today is in keeping with the 
system as created.  Under a legal realist view, the system we 
 
 251. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Trade-
mark Law, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 267, 304 (1988). 
 252. See Litman, supra note 242, at 1730. 
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have today is in keeping with the goals of the winning side in 
the contest surrounding its creation. 
The commercialization theory offered in this Article shows 
how disparate features of the existing patent sys-
tempreviously thought to be unrelated or mutually antitheti-
calactually operate together to effectively promote invention 
commercialization.  While endeavoring to answer Dean Wig-
more’s request for someone to stand up more boldly for the 
rightness of the patent system,253 this Article has also provided 
a new and useful framework for studying the operation of the 

















 253.  See Wigmore, supra note 198. 
